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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON INNOVATION IN AN OPEN
ECONOMY
by
Saleh Sahabehtabrizy
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Rebecca Neumann
In this dissertation, I examine selected open economy determinants of innovation
input and output. One chapter explores the linkages between relative national prices
and R&D expenditures, and two other chapters look specifically at trade in innova-
tive tasks.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, entitled “Industrial Research and Develop-
ment and Exchange Rate Depreciation in a Small Open Economy,” I examine the
effect of the changes in relative national prices, as measured by industry-specific
real exchange rates, on industrial R&D expenditures in a small open economy. Pre-
vious findings put emphasis on sectoral heterogeneities that are driven merely by
R&D or exporting activities, and the results are not conclusive. In this chapter,
I incorporate R&D capabilities, exporting activities, and sectoral heterogeneities
in pass-through elasticities into a partial equilibrium model of R&D expenditures
to advance our understanding of firms’ innovative efforts in a small open economy
where relative national prices play an important role. I employ this model to predict
how changes in industry-specific real exchange rates affect the R&D expenditures
of a representative firm. Given the marginal profitability of R&D capabilities, the
direction of R&D responses in this model depends upon the pass-through behavior
of the firms: under some regularity conditions about the pass-through elasticities,
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an exchange rate depreciation is expected to adversely affects the R&D expenditures
in those industries where the domestic and foreign prices are less sensitive to the
changes in spot exchange rate. Employing data from a panel of industries in Korea,
I test the predictions of the model. The results verify that a lagged depreciation
in the industry-specific real exchange rate has an adverse effect on industrial R&D
expenditures. Exploring the effect of industry-level heterogeneities in pass-through
elasticities, the results suggest that this adverse effect is particularly evident among
highly concentrated industries with high export shares, which are expected to have
relatively low pass-through.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, entitled “An Empirical Assessment of the
Effects of Trade in Innovative Tasks on Innovation Output,” I study the effect of
trade in innovative tasks, as measured by off-shoring R&D, design and engineering
activities, on the extensive and the intensive margins of innovation output. Firm-
level observations in this study are taken from a recent survey of about 14,750 firms
in seven European countries. This survey provides me with a wide range of con-
trol covariates as well as useful instrumental variables, which enable me to address
the potential for reverse causality and identify the parameter of interest. The IV
results indicate that those multinational corporations that off-shore their innova-
tive activities are 60% more likely to innovate, and the share of innovative product
sales in their total turnover is 35% greater than similar firms. I also find that trade
in innovative tasks is beneficial when such trade is in product innovation, but not
when such trade is in process innovation. This paper is forthcoming in the Southern
Economic Journal.
In the third chapter of my dissertation, entitled “Productivity and Trade in Innova-
tive Tasks,” I use a representative sub-sample of the same firm-level survey as in the
second chapter to examine the productivity premium of those firms that partake in
trade in innovative tasks. For this sub-sample I have access to an estimated pro-
iii
ductivity measure, which enables me to explore the heterogeneities in productivity.
The results suggest that, compared to the other firms in the full sample and also
to the sub-sample of multinational firms, those that off-shore their innovative tasks
enjoy a productivity premium. In fact, I find that those firms are more productive
than firms that off-shore the production of their finished products or their semi-
finished products/components. This may explain why, despite the estimated gains
from trade in innovative tasks, only a small number of multinational corporations
partake in this specific task trade.
iv
To my parents: Azita and Behrouz.
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1Chapter 1
Industrial Research and Development and
Exchange Rate Depreciation in a Small Open
Economy
1.1 Introduction
A growing body of international economics literature is concerned with questions
that have been primarily raised in the economics of innovation. Among those, the
open economy determinants of R&D investments are of interest. Beyond the signif-
icance of firms’ innovation efforts in endogenous growth models, there are at least
three empirical reasons that motivate the importance of R&D investments. First,
R&D investments contribute to firms’ productivity (e.g. Aw et al., 2011). Second,
investments in innovation input not only contribute to the firms’ innovation output,
but they also increase the absorptive capacity of the economy (e.g. Griffith et al.,
2004). Third, the social returns to R&D investments are often greater than their
private returns, generating some positive externalities (e.g. Bloom et al., 2013).
In this research, I focus on how the industrial R&D expenditures in a small
open economy respond to changes in relative national prices, as measured by the
industry-specific effective real exchange rates. The R&D expenditures are a func-
tion of investments in R&D equipment and include their utilization cost (e.g. the
wage bill for the scientists, engineers, or designers). The stock of R&D equipment
is expected to affect the innovative capability and, hence, the future profitability of
the firms. In an open economy, current and future profit depend partially on export
2revenue. Also, part of the inputs that are used for R&D purposes may be imported.
Therefore, the optimal decision regarding R&D expenditures may depend on the
relative national prices. Exploring this dynamic adds upon our understanding of
firms’ innovation efforts.
The underlying question of this paper relates to a broad line of research that is
primarily concerned with the impact of exchange rate swings on investment. Within
this line of research, I closely follow the framework introduced by Campa and Gold-
berg (1999). Under this framework, the responsiveness of investments to the changes
in exchange rate depends not only on exporting activities and the share of imported
inputs, but is also a function of the mark-ups. Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) extend
this framework and make use of it in a firm-level study, suggesting that changes in
the real exchange rate affect the investment decisions through two channels. First,
the earning channel, which reflects the effects of price competitiveness in the export
market and import competition. Second, the cost channel, which reflects the effects
of the changes in imported input prices. To this framework, Landon and Smith
(2009) add imported capital goods, which are used along with domestic labor in
final goods production, to examine how long the impact of a currency depreciation
on investment lasts. They also explore the difference in investment responses that
are observed in the service and manufacturing sectors.
Under the Campa and Goldberg framework, I present a parsimonious model that
incorporates the R&D capability of a representative firm into its profit function in
order to provide a prediction for the effect of changes in the real exchange rate on
R&D expenditures. The representative firm in this model maximizes its value, as
measured by the expected discounted present value of the stream of current and
future real net cash flows, by choosing its investment in R&D inputs given its max-
imized profit and the spot exchange rate. The firm’s optimal R&D expenditure is
then determined jointly by the optimal R&D investment, the R&D input prices,
3and a parameter that governs the utilization cost of the optimal investment. I then
explore the effect of a shock to the spot exchange rate, which alters the relative
national prices not only directly but also via pass-through channels, on the optimal
R&D expenditures. Conditional upon certain regularities in pass-through elastici-
ties, the main proposition of the model suggests that real exchange rate depreciation
has an adverse effect on R&D expenditures. This adverse effect is expected to be
evident among the industries that have relatively low pass-through elasticities.
I test the above proposition using the industry-level observations for a panel of
manufacturing industries in Korea. The data in use offers variations across 17 man-
ufacturing (two-digits) industries over a 10 year window (1995-2004). I first make
use of these observations in a Panel Vector Autoregressive model, and provide an es-
timation of the variance decompositions. As illustrated by Judson and Owen (1999)
and Buddelmeyer et al. (2008), however, a Corrected Least Square with Dummy
Variables estimator is expected to provide a better estimation of the parameters of
interest in a dynamic panel model with relatively small cross-section and time-series
dimensions. Thus, I go beyond the Panel Vector Autoregressive model, and estimate
the effect of the changes in the effective real exchange rate on R&D expenditures
using the Corrected Least Square with Dummy Variables estimation technique. In
both cases, the results indicate that a lagged shock to the industry-specific effective
real exchange rate has a negative effect on current industry-level R&D expenditures.
Exploring the industry-level heterogeneities, I modify the Corrected Least Square
with Dummy Variables estimations to examine whether the above effect is of greater
significance among the industries with low pass-through elasticities. The results in-
dicate that a depreciation in industry-specific real exchange rate has a significant
adverse effect on the R&D expenditures in those industries in which firms are of rel-
atively greater sizes. As indicated in Berman et al. (2012), Chatterjee et al. (2013),
and Amiti et al. (2014), these relatively large firms tend to have lower pass-through
4elasticities.1 Given their export shares, these firms are more likely to reduce their
R&D expenditures in response to an increase in price competitiveness, as predicted
by the main proposition of the model.
In Section 1.2, previous empirical findings are summarized. A parsimonious
model of R&D is then introduced in Section 1.3, while the regression analyses are
discussed in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Background
The existing empirical studies on the relationship between R&D and exchange rate
can be divided into two broad categories. Some of these studies examine the effect
of exchange rate uncertainty or volatility on R&D expenditures, while other stud-
ies examine the direction of changes in R&D expenditures following exchange rate
swings. Empirical evidence showing an adverse effect of exchange rate uncertainty
or volatility on R&D expenditures seem to be conclusive (e.g. Becker and Hall,
2009; Mahagaonkar et al., 2009).2 Conversely, evidence on the direction of changes
in R&D expenditures in response to changes in relative national prices remain in-
conclusive.
Zietz and Fayissa (1994), for instance, suggest that changes in R&D expendi-
tures in response to exchange rate appreciation are conditional upon the intensity
of firms’ innovation efforts. Using the observations from a panel of manufacturing
firms in the US, they provide some evidence suggesting that R&D-intensive firms
increase their R&D expenditures following the increase in competition caused by
1See Garetto (2014) for a recent survey of the theoretical foundations for the patterns of firm-
level heterogeneities in pass-through elasticities.
2See Aghion et al. (2009, Sec. 3) for theoretical predictions about the effect of exchange rate
volatility on innovative activities. Their model implies that, under credit constraint and sticky
wages, exchange rate volatility has an adverse effect on productivity growth through the channel
of innovative activities. Yet, greater financial development is expected to decrease this adverse
effect.
5the exchange rate appreciations.3 Yet, they do not find any significant responses
among the firms that are not involved in R&D-intensive industries.4
Funk (2003), on the other hand, suggests that changes in R&D expenditures in
response to exchange rate swings may depend on the firms’ export status. In fact, he
does not find enough support for the conclusion drawn by Zietz and Fayissa (1994).
Using another panel of manufacturing firms in the US, his findings suggest that
exchange rate appreciation negatively affects the R&D expenditure of the domestic
firms, and has no significant effect on the R&D expenditures of the exporting firms.5
He also finds that exporting firms increase their R&D expenditures following the
increase in their competitive advantage caused by exchange rate depreciation.
The above findings, though inconclusive, underline the significance of industry-
level heterogeneities in R&D and exporting activities for the empirical analyses that
are focused on the direction of changes in R&D expenditures in response to changes
in relative national prices.
In what follows, I am primarily concerned with the changes in real exchange
rate rather than changes in uncertainty or volatility, and I contribute to this line
of literature in two ways. First, I introduce a novel theoretical framework, which
incorporates a specific type of investment into the Campa and Goldberg framework.
Along with the heterogeneities in pass-through elasticities, as motivated by Campa
and Goldberg (1999), this model takes into account the innovative capabilities of
the firms, as motivated by Zietz and Fayissa (1994), and their exporting activities,
as motivated by Funk (2003). Second, I employ the variations in industry-specific
effective real exchange rates, rather than aggregate exchange rate measures, to test
3This result counters the general findings by Scherer and Huh (1992), who suggest that an
increase in high-technology import competition may have an adverse effect on R&D-intensity.
4In Zietz and Fayissa (1994), industries with average R&D-intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure
adjusted by sales revenue) greater than 3% are identified as “R&D-intensive.” This includes in-
dustries such as “Instruments and Related Products, Electric and Electronic Equipment, Chemicals
and Allied Products, and Transportation Equipment.”
5The adverse effect of exchange rate appreciation on R&D expenditure is also documented by
Becker and Pain (2008) for a panel of UK manufacturing industries.
6the proposition of the model. Using dynamic panel data estimation techniques, I
am also able to control for industry- and time-specific effects, which improves the
precision of the estimations.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 The set-up
Following the framework introduced by Campa and Goldberg (1999) and using the
relative national price measures as in Landon and Smith (2009), I introduce a par-
tial equilibrium model in this section to predict how a shock to the exchange rate
affects the R&D expenditures of a representative firm in a small open economy. I
assume that there are J industries in this small open economy that produce finished
products. Given their R&D capabilities (denoted by Rj,t), firms in these industries
produce their output at time t employing domestic and foreign inputs (denoted by
ldj,t and l
f
j,t). These products are sold in the domestic market (denoted by Q
d
j,t) as
well as the foreign market (denoted by Qfj,t). I assume that none of these J industries
produce any products that can be used as innovation inputs. Those inputs are solely
produced by a monopolist in industry i. This monopolist produces R&D equipment
at time t employing imported inputs (denoted by mi,t).
6 The R&D equipment are
sold only in the domestic market. I assume the same industry structure for the rest
of the world.
At any given time t, the representative firm from industry j is faced with two
maximization problems. Observing the nominal exchange rate (denoted by St) at
the beginning of the period, and given its stock of R&D capability (Rj,t), firm j
maximizes its profit at time t by choosing its domestic and foreign sales (Qdj,t and
Qfj,t) as well as the level of its domestic and foreign inputs (l
d
j,t and l
f
j,t). Given the
6In what follows, I use the terms “R&D equipment” and “R&D inputs” interchangeably.
7maximized profit, the representative firm then maximizes its expected discounted
present value of the stream of current and future real net cash flows choosing its
R&D investments (denoted by IRj,t) at the end of period t.
The profit maximization at the beginning of period t is given by:
Πj,t = max
{Qdj,t,Qfj,t,ldj,t,lfj,t}
{Gd(Rj,t)(
P dj,t
Pt
)Qdj,t+G
f (Rj,t)(
StP
f
j,t
Pt
)Qfj,t−(
W dt
Pt
)ldj,t−(
StW
f
t
Pt
)lfj,t}
(1.1)
where:
Qj(l
d
j,t, l
f
j,t) = Q
d
j,t +Q
f
j,t (1.2)
Rj,t = Rj,t−1 + IRj,t−1 (1.3)
Gc : Gc(0) = 0 ; 0 ≤ Gc(Rj,t) ≤ 1 ; ∂G
c
t
∂Rj,t
≥ 0 ; c ∈ {d, f}
In Equation 1.1, Qdj,t and Q
f
j,t are the domestic and foreign sales made by firm j
at time t.
P dj,t
Pt
and
StP
f
j,t
Pt
are the real prices that are set by firm j for the domestic and
foreign markets given the optimal sales in each market, where Pt is a measure of the
domestic producer price level, and St is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the
price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The cumulative
distribution functions Gc(Rj,t), where c ∈ {d, f}, governs the realized proportion of
firm j ’s earnings: Gd(Rj,t) governs the realized proportion of its domestic revenue,
and Gf (Rj,t) governs the realized proportion of its export revenue. These cumula-
tive distribution functions depend on the current stock of R&D capability at firm j.
Using these cumulative distribution functions, I directly incorporate the R&D ca-
pability of firm i, which is simply the sock of previous investments in R&D (as given
by Equation 1.3), into its profit function. Since Gd(0) = Gf (0) = 0, Equation 1.1
implies that a firm with no R&D capability is not able to realize any revenue from
the foreign markets nor from the domestic market. Also, the greater competition
in foreign product markets calls for greater R&D capabilities for those who partake
8in exporting activities. Thus, I assume that Gf (Rj,t) first order stochastically dom-
inates Gd(Rj,t): i.e. G
f (Rj,t) ≤ Gd(Rj,t);∀Rj,t. This implies that firms need greater
R&D capabilities in order to reach a given likelihood of export revenue compared to
the R&D capabilities that are required for the same likelihood of domestic revenue.
To illustrate how Gd(Rj,t) and G
f (Rj,t) affect the profit function, let us assume
that innovation only occurs in the distribution process (i.e. the process by which
finished products are distributed from firm j ’s factory to domestic and foreign mar-
kets). The greater the R&D capabilities, the more innovative the distribution pro-
cess. Also, assume that an innovation in the distribution process only lowers the
iceberg cost of distribution.7 Given its R&D capabilities, firm j chooses its pro-
duction for the domestic and foreign markets. Ultimately, however, the realized
revenue from these two markets depend on the iceberg cost of distribution, which
is determined by the R&D capability of the firm. This iceberg cost is greater for
the foreign markets due to their distance from firm j ’s factory, which provides a
justification for the first order stochastic dominance of Gf (Rj,t) over G
d(Rj,t).
8
Given its maximized profit, the intertemporal optimization of firm j at the end
of period t is as follows:
Vt = max
{IRj,s}∞s=t
E{
∞∑
τ=0
βτ [Πj,t+τ −RDj,t+τ ]} (1.4)
where:
RDj,t =
P di,t
Pt
IRj,t +
ψ
2
(
P di,t
Pt
IRj,t)
2 (1.5)
P di,t
Pt
= p(A,Ωt, St, P
f
i,t, Pt) (1.6)
7The trade cost can be modeled as an iceberg cost: the further a good travels, the more of the
good is lost in transit.
8Incorporating the cumulative distribution functions is motivated by models that take into
account the difference between the trade costs facing new- and continuing-exporters using the
draws from two separate distributions. For instance, see Alessandria et al. (2013, p.12).
9In Equation 1.4, Πj,t is the maximized profit of firm j at time t, and RDj,t is its
R&D expenditures. Parameter β is the discount factor. The R&D expenditures are
a function of the amount of investment in R&D equipment (denoted by IRj,t), their
prices (denoted by
P di,t
Pt
), and their utilization costs (represented by ψ
2
(
P di,t
Pt
IRj,t)
2). The
convexity of utilization cost is governed by parameter ψ. The price of R&D inputs
(
P di,t
Pt
) is set by the monopolist in industry i, who produces the R&D equipment. As I
show below, this price depends on the time-invariant productivity of the monopolist
(A), the sum of the marginal profitability of R&D capabilities of all the firms across
the J industries (Ωt), the nominal exchange rate (St), the price of imported inputs
that are employed by the monopolist to produce R&D equipment (P fi,t), and the
domestic producer price level (Pt). This is summarized in Equation 1.6.
It is important to distinguish between three different, yet related, sources of
variations in this model. By investment in R&D inputs (IRj,t), I refer to the physical
R&D equipment that are demanded by firm j at time t. By R&D capabilities (Rj,t),
I refer to the stock of physical R&D equipment (as given by Equation 1.3).9 By
R&D expenditures (RDj,t), I refer to the value of physical R&D equipment that are
demanded by firm j at time t plus their utilization cost (as given by Equation 1.5).
One can think of the utilization cost as the lump sum of the labor costs associated
with the investments in R&D inputs (e.g. the wage bill for the scientists who are
involved in innovative activities at firm j ). Ultimately, this model examines how a
shock to price competitiveness affects the R&D expenditures. Yet, the other sources
of variations are also crucial for this model.
The monopolist in industry i maximizes its profit by setting the price of its
products (
P di,t
Pt
), given the nominal exchange rate and the aggregate demand for
R&D inputs by all the firms across the J industries (denoted by IRt ). Thus, the
9It is conventional to assign a 15% depreciation rate to the stock of R&D capabilities (e.g. Hall
et al., 2005, p.21). For simplicity, however, I assume that there is no depreciation in this model.
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profit maximization of the monopolist is given by:
Πi,t = max
{P
d
i,t
Pt
}
{P
d
i,t
Pt
IRt −
StP
f
i,t
Pt
mi,t} (1.7)
where:
IRt = q(A,mi,t) (1.8)
IRt =
∑
j
IRj,t (1.9)
Equation 1.8 gives the production function of the monopolist, which depends
on its time-invariant productivity (A) and the amount of imported inputs that are
employed to produce R&D equipment (mi,t), and Equation 1.9 gives the aggregate
demand for R&D equipment, which the monopolist faces.
The set-up of the optimizations above differs from Campa and Goldberg (1999)
in two ways. First, the R&D capability of firm j, which is the stock variable in
this model, is not directly incorporated in the production function. In fact, Campa
and Goldberg (1999) introduce the physical capital stock as a quasi-fixed factor of
production. However, the stock of R&D capabilities are different from firms’ capital
stock. Thus, I modify their set-up accordingly by using the stock variable as a
determinant of the realized proportion of domestic and foreign revenue in the profit
function (as given by Equation 1.1) rather than as an input for production.10 Second,
the production of R&D equipment is explicitly modeled here. This enables me to
explicitly incorporate the price of R&D equipment, which is a function of imported
input prices (as given by Equation 1.6), into the model. At the same time, I am able
to use the utilization cost in a simplified fashion (as given by Equation 1.5). This
utilization cost is, in essence, a simplified version of the convex adjustment costs
10For this model I do not incorporate the physical capital stock into the production function
of the representative firm, though this could be added to study the choices over investment in
physical capital versus R&D. In fact, this could be an interesting extension to this model. In this
paper, however, I only focus on the changes in one source of stock variable (the R&D capabilities)
to avoid unnecessary complications.
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introduced by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
Following Landon and Smith (2009), I make use of the nominal exchange rate,
foreign industry-specific prices and the measure of the domestic price level to define
the industry-specific real exchange rate measure (henceforth, RER):
RERj,t =
StP
f
j,t
Pt
(1.10)
In this model, the variations in RER are generated by shocks to the spot exchange
rate. Depending on the industry-specific prices in the foreign market, however, a
shock to the spot exchange rate can generate different RER variations across the
industries. Also, a shock to the spot exchange rate can generate different responses
in the prices that are set for the domestic market. I take these heterogeneities into
account not only in the model, but also in the empirical analysis of this paper. This
is, in fact, one of the important contributions of this paper. In previous studies (no-
tably, Zietz and Fayissa (1994) and Funk (2003)), the industry-level heterogeneities
in pass-through elasticities are not taken into account. Instead, the authors focus
on the heterogeneities in either R&D capabilities or exporting activities. Though
my model takes these two variations into account, I focus on the industry-specific
pass-through elasticities to study the effect of an exchange rate depreciation on
industry-level R&D expenditures.
1.3.2 The optimizations
In this section, I describe the optimal decisions of the representative firm j (upon
its production, factor employment, and investment in R&D inputs) and monopolist
i (upon the price of R&D inputs).
The timing of firm j ’s decisions is as follows: as in Campa and Goldberg (1999,
p.291), the spot exchange rate is revealed to the firms at the beginning of the period.
Then, firm j maximizes its profit (Π∗j,t). Given the exchange rate and its maximized
12
profit, firm j chooses its investment in R&D equipment (IRj,t
∗
) at the end of period t.
This investment determines its optimal R&D expenditures (RD∗j,t).
11 This timing is
crucial in solving the optimization. It also motivates the methods and the regression
functions in use in the empirical analysis of this paper.
The profit maximization of firm j is given in Appendix 1.6.1. As illustrated in
the appendix, the optimal quantities produced for the domestic and foreign markets
(Qdj,t
∗
and Qfj,t
∗
), and the optimal employment of domestic and foreign inputs (ldj,t
∗
and lfj,t
∗
) are not a function of current investment in R&D equipment (IRj,t). They
are rather a function of the stock of R&D capabilities (Rj,t), which is a function
of previous stock and previous investment in R&D equipment.12 Thus, given the
maximized profit of firm j, the focus in this section is on the choice of the optimal
investment in R&D inputs (IRj,t
∗
) via the intertemporal optimization problem given
by Equation 1.4.
To solve for firm j ’s optimal investment in R&D inputs, I make two assumptions.
First, I assume that firm j is small. Thus, its demand for R&D inputs has no impact
on R&D input prices set by monopolist i. This implies: ∂
∂IRj,t
(
P di,t
Pt
) = 0.13 Second,
following Campa and Goldberg (1999), I assume that any shocks to the exchange
rate, which is the only source of uncertainty in this model, permanently change the
spot exchange rate. This implies: E(St+τ ) = St ; τ ≥ 1.14
Solving the intertemporal optimization (as given by Equation 1.4), I obtain the
11The price of R&D equipment is set by the monopolist given the aggregate demand for R&D
equipment.
12Equations 1.38 and 1.43 in Appendix 1.6.1 give the NFOCs that govern firm j ’s optimal choices
in its profit maximization.
13I assume that firm j is large enough in its own industry and has price-setting power. However,
it is small enough in the market for R&D equipment, such that its demand for those equipment
has no effects on the price set by monopolist i. This assumption comes with a caveat: it implies
that the R&D equipment in this model are of general use for innovative activities, and they are
not for particular usage in only one industry or two.
14In their work, Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) test for this persistency, suggesting that this is an
empirically sound assumption.
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following condition, which governs the optimal investment in R&D inputs:15
IRj,t
∗
=
1
ψ
[(
1
P di,t
Pt
)2E{
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [
∂Πt+τ
∂Rj,t+τ
]} − 1
P di,t
Pt
] (1.11)
The condition given by Equation 1.11 implies that firm j ’s optimal investment
in R&D inputs is an increasing function of the expected discounted present value
of future marginal profitability of its R&D capability (i.e. E{
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [∂Πt+τ
∂Rt+τ
]}). The
greater the expected future marginal profitability of R&D capabilities, the greater
the investment in R&D inputs at time t. Under certain conditions, Equation 1.11
also implies that the demand for R&D inputs is a decreasing function of the input
prices (
P di,t
Pt
).16 Plus, investment in R&D inputs is adversely affected by parameter
ψ, which governs the convexity of the utilization cost. Overall, then, the greater the
R&D input prices or the utilization cost, the lower the investment in R&D inputs.
In order to identify the effect of a shock to the exchange rate on firm j ’s op-
timal R&D expenditures, Equation 1.11 can be simplified by simplifying the term
representing the expected discounted present value of future marginal profitability
of R&D capabilities. Let gd(Rt) and g
f (Rt) be the probability density function
for the domestic and foreign revenue, respectively. I show in Appendix 1.6.4 that
Equation 1.11 can be re-written in the following fashion:
IRj,t
∗
=
1
ψ
[(
1
P di,t
Pt
)2E{
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [gd(Rj,t+τ )
P dj,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qdj,t+τ+g
f (Rj,t+τ )
St+τP
f
j,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qfj,t+τ ]}−
1
P di,t
Pt
]
(1.12)
where:
gd(Rj,t+τ ) =
∂Gd(Rj,t+τ )
∂Rj,t+τ
(1.13)
gf (Rj,t+τ ) =
∂Gf (Rj,t+τ )
∂Rj,t+τ
(1.14)
15See Appendix 1.6.2 for detailed derivation of the condition given by Equation 1.11.
16See Appendix 1.6.3 for detailed derivation of the condition by which the demand for R&D
input is downward-sloping.
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Since I assume that changes in the spot exchange rate are permanent (i.e.
E(St+τ ) = St ; τ ≥ 1), Equation 1.12 can be re-written in the following fashion:17
IRj,t
∗
=
1
ψ
[(
1
P di,t
Pt
)2(
β
1− β )(g
d(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t)−
1
P di,t
Pt
] (1.15)
Given the representative firm’s optimal investment in R&D inputs, monopolist
i maximizes its profit by setting the price of R&D inputs. Using Equations 1.9
and 1.15, I derive the market demand facing the monopolist as the sum of the
individual demands across all the firms in the J industries. Let N be the number
of firms across the J industries, and let Ωt be the sum of the marginal profitability
of R&D capabilities of those firms. Then, the market demand for R&D equipment
is as follows:
IRt =
∑
j
IRj,t =
1
ψ
[(
1
P di,t
Pt
)2Ωt − ( 1P di,t
Pt
)N ] (1.16)
where:
Ωt :=
∑
j
(
β
1− β )(g
d(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t) (1.17)
Given the above market demand, the profit-maximizing price of R&D equipment,
set by monopolist i, is derived in Appendix 1.6.5. For this optimization, I assume
a simple production function, with a time-invariant productivity measure (A), in
which the monopolist employs an imported input (mi,t), which is specific to the
production of R&D equipment. As given by Equation 1.7, the choice variable in
this maximization is the price of R&D equipment (
P di,t
Pt
). Also, since I assume that
monopolist i is from a small open economy, the price of the imported input (
P fi,t
Pt
)
is given and constant. This implies: ∂
∂mi,t
(
P fi,t
Pt
) = 0. Under these assumptions, the
17See Appendix 1.6.4 (Equations 1.52-1.55) for detailed derivation of Equation 1.15. Also, refer
to Campa and Goldberg (1999, pp.292-293) for an example of how a permanent change in the
spot exchange rate affects the expected marginal profitability of their capital stock variable in the
representative firm’s optimization.
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profit-maximizing price of R&D equipment is as follows:
P di,t
Pt
∗
=
2Ωt(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
)
AΩt +N(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
)
(1.18)
1.3.3 R&D expenditures and exchange rate depreciation
In this section, I examine the direction of changes in R&D expenditures in response
to exchange rate depreciation. Using Equations 1.5 and 1.15 and rearranging some
of the terms, firm j ’s optimal R&D expenditure at time t is as follows:
RD∗j,t =(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β ){
1
P di,t
Pt
[gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t]−
1− β
β
} (1.19)
+
ψ
2
[(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )]
2{ 1
P di,t
Pt
[gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t]−
1− β
β
}2
I examine how a shock to the spot exchange rate affects the optimal R&D ex-
penditures as given by Equation 1.19. As in Campa and Goldberg (1999), I assume
that a shock to the spot exchange rate has no direct impact on the optimal quan-
tities sold in the domestic and foreign markets. The prices are, therefore, the only
channels through which the spot exchange rate may affect firm j ’s optimal R&D
expenditures. As given in Equation 1.19, the changes in prices, caused by a shock
to the spot exchange rate, may occur due to two separate effects. First, the price
of exports denominated in domestic currency changes in response to a shock to the
spot exchange rate. This can be captured by changes in
StP
f
j,t
Pt
, given
P fj,t
Pt
. Second,
the domestic and foreign prices, which are set by firm j, change in response to a
shock to the spot exchange rate. This pass-through effect can be captured by the
changes in
P dj,t
Pt
and
P fj,t
Pt
, given St.
In order to find the direction of changes in firm j ’s R&D expenditures following
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a shock to the spot exchange rate (i.e. sign{∂RD∗j,t
∂St
}), I re-write Equation 1.19 in
the following fashion:
RD∗j,t = (
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β ){yt −
1− β
β
}+ ψ
2
[(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )]
2{y2t + (
1− β
β
)2 − 2(1− β
β
)yt}
(1.20)
where:
yt := y(St, P
d
j,t, P
f
j,t, P
d
i,t, Pt, Q
d
j,t, Q
f
j,t, Rj,t) =
1
P di,t
Pt
[gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t]
(1.21)
In Appendix 1.6.6, I first show that: sign{∂RD∗j,t
∂St
} = sign{ ∂yt
∂St
}. Then, I derive
the following:18
∂yt
∂St
=(
1
St
)(
1
P di,t
Pt
){ηdj,tgd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + η
f
j,tg
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t(1.22)
− ηi,t(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t)}
where:
ηdj,t :=
∂(P dj,t/Pt)
∂St
× St
P dj,t/Pt
(1.23)
ηfj,t :=
∂(P fj,t/Pt)
∂St
× St
P fj,t/Pt
(1.24)
ηi,t :=
∂(P di,t/Pt)
∂St
× St
P di,t/Pt
(1.25)
The results above suggest that the direction of changes in firm j ’s R&D expen-
ditures following a shock to the spot exchange rate are a function of pass-through
elasticities that are given by Equations 1.23-1.25. The elasticities given by Equa-
tions 1.23 and 1.24 illustrate how firm j ’s price-setting in the domestic and foreign
18See Appendix 1.6.6 (Equations 1.60-1.62) for detailed derivation of Equation 1.22.
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markets change in response to a change in the spot exchange rate. The elasticity
given by Equation 1.25 illustrates how monopolist i ’s price-setting changes in re-
sponse to a change in the spot exchange rate.
I determine the sign of the partial derivative given by Equation 1.22 by assuming
that the pass-through elasticities of the domestic and foreign prices in industry j (as
given by Equation 1.23 and 1.24) are the same (i.e. ηdj,t = η
f
j,t = ηj,t). Imposing this
assumption, I focus on the difference between the sensitivity of industry-level prices
to the changes in the spot exchange rate across industry j and i as measured by ηj,t
and ηi,t, respectively.
A large body of empirical research offers certain guidelines for the magnitude
of ηj,t and ηi,t.
19 Some studies focus on the differences in pass-through elastici-
ties across different countries (e.g. Bussie`re et al., 2014; Brun-Aguerre et al., 2012).
Others use disaggregated data to examine industry-level pass-through elasticities
(e.g. Campa and Goldberg, 2005; Bhattacharya et al., 2008) and also firm-level
pass-through elasticities (e.g. Berman et al., 2012; Chatterjee et al., 2013; Amiti
et al., 2014; Garetto, 2014) across different countries. The heterogeneities between
different industries and countries notwithstanding, these studies provide empirical
support for partial pass-through elasticities in manufacturing. This implies that the
elasticities in Equations 1.23-1.25 are in practice greater than zero (i.e. no perfect
local currency pricing), but lower than one (i.e. no perfect producer currency pric-
ing). These findings suggest that: 0 < ηj,t < 1 and 0 < ηi,t < 1.
19See Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for a survey of the recent empirical findings on exchange
rates and prices.
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Assuming that ηdj,t = η
f
j,t = ηj,t, I obtain the following:
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sign{∂RD
∗
t
∂St
} =sign{ ∂yt
∂St
} (1.26)
=sign{(ηj,t − ηi,t)(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t) + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t}
Given Equation 1.26, the sign of the partial derivative of optimal R&D expen-
ditures with respect to spot exchange rate is negative when the following condition
is met:
ηi,t − ηj,t >
gf (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t
gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t
(1.27)
The LHS of Inequality 1.27 is the difference between pass-through elasticities in
industries i and industry j. The ratio on the RHS, which lies between zero and one,
measures the relative importance of exports in the marginal profitability of R&D
capabilities at time t.21
The results above lead to the following proposition:
Proposition: Assuming that the pass-through elasticities of the domestic and
foreign prices in industry j are the same (i.e. ηfj,t = η
d
j,t), an increase in price com-
petitiveness, caused by a positive shock to the spot exchange rate, adversely affects
the R&D expenditures in industry j provided that the pass-through elasticity of in-
novation input prices is sufficiently larger than the pass-through elasticity of prices
in industry j, as given by Inequality 1.27.
This model illustrates that the response of R&D expenditures to an exchange
rate shock may be positive or negative (e.g. Equation 1.26). The direction of this
response depends upon the sensitivity of firm j ’s prices to the changes in spot ex-
change rate. Given the relative importance of exports in the marginal profitability
20See Appendix 1.6.6 (Equations 1.60-1.64) for detailed derivation of Equation 1.26.
21The marginal profitability of R&D capability is given by Equation 1.51 in Appendix 1.6.4.
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of R&D capabilities, I expect that firm j reduces its R&D expenditures in the face
of exchange rate depreciation when, relative to prices in industry j, innovation input
prices are sufficiently sensitive to the changes in exchange rate.22 Taking the R&D
capabilities and exporting activities into account, this implies that the adverse ef-
fect of an exchange rate depreciation on R&D expenditure is more likely for those
industries in which the domestic and foreign prices are less sensitive to the changes
in spot exchange rate.
1.4 Regression analyses
In this section, I test for the direction of industry-level responses as proposed by the
theoretical prediction under the condition given by Inequality 1.27. The magnitude
of this adverse effect is also of interest in this empirical exercise. For this purpose, I
examine the industrial R&D in Korea, and make use of the Effective Real Exchange
Rates (henceforth, ERER) as a measure for relative national prices.
As illustrated in Figure 11.7, the changes in ERER and the changes in the aggre-
gate manufacturing R&D expenditures in Korea appear to covary to some extent.
Yet, there is no unified pattern evident in this case. The number of aggregate
observations is also rather limited for reliable statistical inference. Thus, for the re-
gression analyses of this paper, I make use of industry-level observations to examine
how changes in industry-specific ERER affect industry-level R&D expenditures in
Korea.
The underlying empirical questions in this paper are twofold:
1.) Does an improvement in price competitiveness, measured by industry-specific
22Given the optimal price set by monopolist i (as given by Equation 1.18), it is easy to show
the following:
ηi,t = (
1
Pd
i,t
Pt
)(
2A(Ωt)
2(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
)
(AΩt+N(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
))2
).
For the purpose of the above proposition, however, only the relative magnitude of pass-through
elasticities matters.
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ERER depreciation, adversely affect the industry-level R&D expenditures in a small
open economy?
2.) Is this adverse effect significant only among the industries that tend to have
lower pass-through elasticities?
To provide an answer to this question, I make use of the panel structure of the
data. I first employ a Panel Vector Autoregressive (henceforth, PVAR) estimation
technique to motivate the underlying empirical relationship between the industry-
specific ERER measures and R&D expenditures. Then, I turn to a Corrected Least
Square with Dummy Variables (henceforth, LSDVC) estimator, which is more suit-
able for the size of the panel used in this paper, to verify the initial empirical findings
and examine the heterogeneities.
In what follows, I introduce the data in Section 1.4.1. Then, I describe my em-
pirical approach more fully in Section 1.4.2, and I report the results in Section 1.4.3.
1.4.1 Data
In the regression analyses below I make use of four data sources. The industry-level
R&D expenditure observations come from the OECD’s Business Enterprise R&D
Expenditure by Industry (OECD, 2012). The industry-level production observations
come from the OECD’s STAN Industry (OECD, 2010). The industry-specific ERER
measures come from the computation done by Lee and Yi (2005). The interest rate
data for the government securities come from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS, 2013). The variables above are collected for Korea over ten years,
from 1995 to 2004.
The sample in use consists of 17 industries (2-digit ISIC, Rev. 3). On average,
these industries contribute to 82% of manufacturing R&D in Korea. The Radio,
Television and Communication Equipment industry (C32) has the greatest share of
the entire manufacturing R&D expenditures in this sample (approximately 30%).
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The Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers industry (C34) also has a large share
(slightly less than 20%). The Chemical and Chemical Product (C24) and other Ma-
chinery and Equipment (C29) each contributes less than 10% but greater than 5%.
Altogether, the remaining 13 industries contribute to more than 20% of manufac-
turing R&D in Korea.23 Table 11.7 provides a complete list of the manufacturing
industries in the sample, and Figure 21.7 illustrates the importance of each of those
industries in the aggregate manufacturing R&D in Korea.
Given the set-up of the model above, I employ industry-specific ERER indices to
introduce an empirically relevant source of relative price variations to the regression
function in use. The industry-specific ERER variations are directly taken from the
computation in Lee and Yi (2005). They make use of the producer price index in
Korea and 12 of its most important trade partners to compute the ERER measure.24
The reference year being 2000, the ERER index is computed by Lee and Yi (2005)
in the following way:
ERERit = Πc(
(SctP
ic
t )/P
i
t
(Sc2000P
ic
2000)/P
i
2000
)w
ic
t (1.28)
where Sct is the price of country c’s currency in won, P
ic
t is the price index for the
industry-country pair ic, and P it is the price index of industry i in Korea at time t.
The trade weight of the industry-country pair ic (denoted by wict ) is computed as
follows:
wict = 0.5(
X ict∑
cX
ic
t
) + 0.5(
M ict∑
cM
ic
t
) (1.29)
where X ict and M
ic
t are industry-level export and import measures, respectively.
For the purpose of this paper, I use the annual average of the index above.25
23These shares are computed for the entire ten year window (1995-2004) using the OECD’s
Business Enterprise R&D Expenditure by Industry (OECD, 2012).
24In order to have access to the ERER variations for the entire ten year window, I use the indices
that exclude China.
25For more details on the construction of the ERER index and the computed variations, see Lee
and Yi (2005) Section 4.1. and Tables H and I.
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This measure is closely related to the relative national price measure used in the
underlying model of the paper, as given by Equation 1.10. There are two differences,
however. To measure purchasing power, the theoretical price measure incorporates
an aggregate price index (i.e. Pt in Equation 1.10), whereas the empirical price mea-
sure incorporates an industry-specific price index (i.e. P it in Equation 1.28). Also, to
be empirically relevant, the empirical price measure is weighted by the trade shares.
Adding an aggregate index of the ERER in Korea, computed by Darvas (2012),
Figure 31.7 illustrates the differences between the aggregate and industry-specific
variations. This figure illustrates how the measure of relative prices in use varies
across different industries.
In Figure 41.7, I plot the changes in the index of industry-level R&D expendi-
tures for four selected industries against the changes in their industry-specific ERER
measure. On average, these four industries contribute to 62% of the entire manufac-
turing R&D in Korea during 1995-2004 period. As Figure 4 illustrates, the inverse
relationship between relative prices and R&D expenditures becomes more evident
once we examine the industry-level variations rather than the aggregate ones.
1.4.2 Empirical approach
I first employ a PVAR estimator to take a first look at the empirical relationship of
interest.26 The endogenous vector of this PVAR estimation consists of the industry-
specific ERER measure, the interest rate (on government securities), the log real
industry-level output, and the log real industry-level R&D expenditures. Since the
R&D expenditures are a function of R&D investments, I control for a measure of
interest rate in the regression functions. This vector is regressed on its lagged value,
a constant term, a parameter representing unobserved industry-specific characteris-
tics, and a parameter representing unobserved year-specific effects.
26See Love and Zicchino (2006) and Fort et al. (2013) for two recent applications of PVAR
estimations.
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As illustrated by Judson and Owen (1999) and Buddelmeyer et al. (2008), the
PVAR estimation may not be the best choice for those panels in which the cross-
section and time-series dimensions are relatively small. Instead, their Monte Carlo
experiments show that for small panels the LSDVC outperforms other dynamic
panel estimators. This is evident for the auto-regressive coefficient, slope coeffi-
cients, and also the fixed-effects. Thus, given the PVAR results, I re-estimate the
empirical relationship of interest employing a LSDVC estimator in a dynamic panel
model. In this model, the log real industry-level R&D expenditures are regressed on
their lagged value, controlling for the industry-specific ERER measure, the interest
rate, the log real industry-level output, and a parameter representing unobserved
industry-specific characteristics. This model also includes a constant term. I then
add either a crisis indicator variable (for the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998)
or a full set of year indicator variables to the model.
I employ a test proposed by De Blander and Dhaene (2012) to test for the unit
roots among the variables that are used in this regression analysis. Compared to
other panel unit root tests, this test is particularly useful when the time-series di-
mension is relatively small. Except for the interest rate, I am not able to reject the
unit root hypothesis for the variables of interest. In what follows, therefore, I use
the first difference variations along with the level variations to make sure that my
estimations are not contaminated by the non-stationary data in use.
The above exercise tests the direction of the changes in R&D expenditures fol-
lowing a depreciation in industry-specific effective real exchange rates. To examine
the industry-level heterogeneities, I modify the LSDVC model and test whether the
significance of the above effect varies across different types of industries. The work-
ing hypothesis is that a depreciation in industry-specific effective real exchange rates
would adversely affect the R&D expenditures in those industries that have relatively
low pass-through elasticities.
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1.4.2.1 The PVAR model
The regression function used in the PVAR estimation is the following:
Yi,t = c0 + ΦYi,t−1 + ci + dt + εi,t (1.30)
where Yi,t consists of the industry-specific ERER measure (ERERi,t), the interest
rate (Tbillt), the log real industry-level output (yi,t), and the log real industry-
level R&D expenditures (rndi,t). In a separate estimation, I also employ the first
difference of the above variables for the same regression function since I cannot reject
the unit root hypothesis for some of the level variations. In Equation 1.30, ci is the
unobserved industry-specific effect, and dt is the unobserved year-specific effect.
Assuming sequential exogeneity (i.e. E(εi,t|Y t−1i , ci, dt) = 0), the specification
above becomes a fixed effect model due to the correlation between the time-invariant
industry-specific intercept (ci) and the lagged endogenous vector (Yi,t−1).
In order to bypass the year-specific effect (dt), the variables in the endogenous
vectors are time-demeaned first:
Y¨i,t = Yi,t − ( 1
N
)
N∑
j=1
Yj,t (1.31)
Following Arellano and Bover (1995, pp.41-43), the variables are then forward
mean-differenced to bypass the industry-specific effect (ci,t):
Y˜i,t = Y¨i,t − ( 1
T − t)
T∑
s=t+1
Y¨i,s (1.32)
After these two transformations, the model can be written in the following way:
Y˜i,t = ΦY˜i,t−1 + ε˜i,t (1.33)
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As expected, the identification restriction is not met under the transformed
model given by Equation 1.33 (i.e. E(Y˜i,t−1ε˜i,t) 6= 0). However, employing for-
ward mean-differenced variations, the transformed error term in Equation 1.33 (i.e.
ε˜i,t = [εi,t− 1N
N∑
j=1
εj,t]− 1T−t{
T∑
s=t+1
[εi,s− 1N
N∑
j=1
εj,s]}) remains orthogonal to the lagged
observations. I make use of this orthogonality to employ the untransformed lagged
variables as instruments for the forward mean-differenced variables.27
1.4.2.2 The LSDVC model
The first regression function used in the LSDVC estimations is the following:
rndi,t = γrndi,t−1 +X ′i,tβ + ci + ui,t (1.34)
where rndi,t is the log real industry-level R&D expenditures, and Xi,t is a control
vector made of the lagged industry-specific ERER measure (ERERi,t−1), the log
real industry-level output (yi,t), and the interest rate (Tbillt). Later, I add either
a crisis indicator variable or a full set of year indicator variables to Xi,t. In this
regression function, ci is the unobserved industry-specific effect.
The second regression function used in the LSDVC estimations is the following:
∆rndi,t = γ∆rndi,t−1 + ∆X ′i,tβ + ci + vi,t (1.35)
where ∆rndi,t is the first difference of log real industry-level R&D expenditures,
and ∆Xi,t is a control vector made of the first difference of lagged industry-specific
ERER measure (∆ERERi,t−1), the first difference of log real industry-level output
(∆yi,t), and the first difference of interest rate (∆Tbillt).
In the regression functions given in Equation 1.34 and 1.35, I assume that cur-
27To use the instruments, System GMM is employed in the estimation procedure written by
Love and Zicchino (2006). However, since in this estimation procedure the number of regressors
and instruments are the same, the estimation results are numerically equivalent to 2SLS. For more,
see Love and Zicchino (2006, pp.193-195).
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rent R&D expenditures are a function of lagged ERER measures. This assumption
is motivated by the timing of the model in Section 1.3.
As illustrated by Bun and Kiviet (2003, p.146), for infinite cross-section dimen-
sion and finite time-series dimension the least square estimation of the parameters
in the above models is inconsistent. Other than this inconsistency, they suggest
that additional bias may arise when cross-section and time-series dimensions are
relatively small. Thus, for each of the above models I initialize the estimation by
System GMM as in Blundell and Bond (1998), which is particularly useful in Equa-
tions 1.34 in which some of the variables have unit roots.28 Then, I follow Bun and
Kiviet (2003) to correct for the bias that may arise in the initial estimation.29
1.4.2.3 The heterogeneities
Given the data limitations, I am unable to estimate the pass-through elasticities
directly. Thus, in order to explore the industry-level heterogeneities, I employ an
indirect measure to identify the industries that tend to have relatively low pass-
through elasticities. Berman et al. (2012), Chatterjee et al. (2013), and Amiti et al.
(2014) observe that the prices that are set by large firms exhibit lower pass-through.
In a sample of Belgian firms, for instance, “while small exporters [...] fully pass on
the exchange rate movements to foreign consumers” (i.e. a nearly complete pass-
through), Amiti et al. (2014) find that “largest exporters offset almost half of the
exchange rate movement by adjusting their prices” (i.e. relatively low pass-through).
Based on these findings, I assume that the pass-through elasticities are relatively
lower in the highly concentrated industries wherein firms are relatively large.
I use the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (henceforth, HHI) for the year 1997, as
reported by the OECD (2004), to rank the industries based on their concentration.
28See Roodman (2009) for more details about the estimation procedure used in the initial System
GMM estimation.
29See Bruno (2005) for more details about the LSDVC estimation procedure. In this paper, I
use a balanced panel data, which is a special case of the estimation procedure discussed in Bruno
(2005).
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The greater the HHI of an industry, the greater the size of the representative firm
and, thus, the lower the pass-through elasticity. I also assume that the computed
concentration ratios for 1997 reflect the concentrations over the entire ten year
window (1995-2004). This is a reasonable assumption since the time-dimension is
fairly small.
Figure 51.7 plots the variations in concentration ratios across the 17 industries
in the sample. Taking 100 as the cut-off ratio, the representative firms that are
involved in the industries where the computed HHI is above the cut-off are expected
to be relatively larger than the representative firms from the other industries. Given
their large sizes, we expect these firms to exhibit lower pass-through in their prices.
Let Di be an indicator variable, taking value one for the industries in which the
computed HHI is greater than 100, and zero otherwise. The pass-through elasticities
are expected to be relatively low in the industries with high HHI, for which Di = 1,
and they are expected to be relatively high in the industries with low HHI, for which
Di = 0. Using this indicator variable, I estimate the parameters of the following
regression function to directly test the main proposition in Section 1.3:
∆rndi,t =γ∆rndi,t−1 + β1∆ERERi,t−1 + β2(Di ∗∆ERERi,t−1) (1.36)
+β3∆yi,t + β4∆xi,t + β5Tbillt + T
′βt + ci + vi,t
where ∆rndi,t is the first difference of log real industry-level R&D expenditures,
∆ERERi,t−1 is the first difference of lagged industry-specific ERER measure, ∆yi,t
is the first difference of log real industry-level output, ∆xi,t−1 is the first difference
of industry-level export shares, Tbillt is the interest rate, T is a vector of year indi-
cators, and ci is the unobserved industry-specific effect. To estimate the parameters
of interest, I employ the LSDVC technique since the cross-section and time-series
dimensions are relatively small, and I also use the stationary variations in R&D
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expenditures, exchange rates, output, export share, and interest rate.
Given the relative importance of exports in the marginal profitability of R&D
capabilities, the main proposition of the model implies that the representative firm
in an industry with low pass-through elasticity is expected to reduce its R&D ex-
penditures in the face of an exchange rate depreciation. Since this proposition, as
formulated in Equation 1.27, is conditional upon the importance of exports in the
marginal profitability of R&D capabilities, I add the control for export shares in the
above model.
Employing the regression function in Equation 1.36, I am able to compare the
effect of a shock to the industry-specific ERER measure in the industries that are ex-
pected to have relatively low pass-through, wherein Di = 1, with the industries that
are expected to have relatively high pass-through, wherein Di = 0. The parameter
of interest for the former group is β1 + β2, and for the latter is β1.
1.4.3 Results
In what follows, I briefly report the PVAR estimation results to motivate the empir-
ical relationship of interest. Then, I present the results for the LSDVC estimations,
which are expected to be more precise than the PVAR estimations.
1.4.3.1 The PVAR results
The estimated Φ̂ parameters of the PVAR models, as given by Equation 1.30, are
reported in this section. The estimation results, reported in Table 21.7 (column I ),
suggest that a lagged ERER depreciation adversely affects the current industrial
R&D expenditures.30 The variance decomposition over the ten year window indi-
cates that the lagged exchange rate variations explain up to 6.8% of the variations in
30From the four equations in the PVAR model, I only report the estimation result for the
equation in which R&D expenditures appear on the LHS. Detailed estimation results available
upon request.
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current industrial R&D expenditure. Also, the lagged variations in interest rate and
output explain up to 4% and 12.7% of the variations in current R&D, respectively.
The remaining variations are explained by the lagged variations in R&D itself.
Since I cannot reject the unit root hypothesis for some of the variables used in
the above estimations, I employ their first differences to make sure that the results
are not contaminated by the non-stationarity of the data.31 As reported in column
II, the same pattern emerges: The lagged changes in ERER are negatively corre-
lated with current changes in R&D expenditures.
In Figure 61.7, I plot the Impulse Response Function of a one-standard-deviation
shock to the changes in ERER.32 In order to obtain this Impulse Response Function,
I assume a Choleski ordering based on the timing of the model in Section 1.3. I
assume that the changes in ERER are exogenous in the system. Those changes,
therefore, affect the interest rate, output, and the R&D expenditures not only con-
temporaneously, but also with a lag. The changes in interest rate affect output and
the R&D expenditures in the same period, and also with a lag. The changes in out-
put affect the R&D expenditures in the same period, and also with a lag. The R&D
expenditures, however, affect the other three variables merely with a lag. Holding
all the other shocks equal to zero, the plot in Figure 61.7 illustrates the magnitude
of the R&D responses to a shock to the changes in ERER.
I also report the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for each of the estimations
in Table 21.7. In row D, I report the differences between the AIC in a model with
two lags and the AIC in a model with one lag. The positive values imply that for
each of the estimations the model with one lag outperforms the model with two lags.
In summary, the PVAR results indicate that a lagged industry-specific ERER
depreciation negatively affects the current industry-level R&D expenditures.
31Employing the unit root test proposed by De Blander and Dhaene (2012), I can safely reject
the unit root hypothesis for the first difference variations in R&D expenditures, ERER, and output.
32The standard errors of the impulses are generated by Monte Carlo simulation with 500 repe-
titions. See Love and Zicchino (2006, p.195) for more details.
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1.4.3.2 The LSDVC results
The estimated auto-regressive parameter (γ̂) and slope parameters (β̂) of the LS-
DVC models, as given by Equation 1.34 and 1.35, are reported in this section. The
parameter of interest is the slope parameter that shows the effect of the variations in
the lagged industry-specific ERER measures on the variations in current industry-
level R&D expenditures. I first report the results for the level variations, and then
I report the results for the first-difference variations.
The estimation results reported in Table 31.7 (column I ) suggest that lagged
ERER measures are negatively correlated with current R&D expenditures. As
shown in column II, this negative correlation remains statistically significant when I
add a control for the crisis years (1997 and 1998). As shown in column III, however,
this negative correlation is not significant when I control for a full vector of year
indicator variables. As for the lagged dependent variable, there exists a positive
correlation between the lagged R&D expenditures and current expenditures. This
correlation remains significant when I control for the crisis years, or when I control
for a full vector of year indicator variables. The magnitude of the estimated auto-
regressive parameter indicates that R&D expenditures are highly persistent. Also,
the results suggest that there exists a positive correlation between current output
and current R&D expenditures. However, this positive correlation is not significant
when I control for a full vector of year indicator variables.
As indicated above, I cannot reject the unit root hypothesis in the variations in
industry-specific R&D expenditures, ERER, and output when I employ the panel
unit root test proposed by De Blander and Dhaene (2012). Also, the estimated
auto-regressive parameter in Equation 1.34, reported in Table 31.7, illustrates that
the variations in industry-level R&D expenditures are highly persistent. Thus, as
given by Equation 1.35, I employ the first difference variations, for which I can safely
reject the unit root hypothesis, to make sure that the above pattern is not driven
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by non-stationarity in the data.
The estimation results reported in Table 41.7 (column I ) suggest that lagged
changes in industry-specific ERER measures are negatively correlated with the cur-
rent changes in industry-level R&D expenditures. This implies that a lagged ERER
depreciation (where ∆ERERt−1 > 0) adversely affects current R&D expenditures.
This negative correlation remains significant when I control for the crisis years (col-
umn II ), or when I control for a full vector of year indicator variables (column III ).
Overall, employing the LSDVC estimation technique for the first-difference data,
I find an adverse effect of an ERER depreciation on R&D expenditures. The under-
lying estimation method in use performs well when the cross-section and time-series
dimensions are relatively small. Also, I am confident that these correlations are not
contaminated by the non-stationarities in the data.
Among other variables in the model, I find a positive and significant correlation
between the current changes in output and changes in R&D expenditures. The
correlation between the current changes in interest rate and changes in R&D expen-
ditures is of negative sign, but it is insignificant. Also, as expected, the estimated
auto-regressive coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Since I can safely reject the unit root hypothesis in level variations of interest
rate, I also estimate a modified model in which I employ the level variations of in-
terest rate along with first difference variations in R&D expenditures, ERER, and
output. The results, reported in Table 51.7, are in line with previous findings.
In summary, the LSDVC results indicate that the lagged (changes in) industry-
specific ERER measures are negatively correlated with the current (changes in)
industry-level R&D expenditures. Also, the current (changes in) output are posi-
tively correlated with current (changes in) R&D expenditures.
The estimated adverse effect of an ERER depreciation on R&D expenditures is
insensitive to the changes in the estimation procedure. In terms of the sign and
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statistical significance, the estimated parameter of interest under LSDVC are highly
comparable to the estimated parameter under PVAR estimation. Overall, these
findings suggest that an increase in price competitiveness, as measured by a depre-
ciation in industry-specific ERER, adversely affects industrial R&D expenditures.
1.4.3.3 The heterogeneities
The estimated auto-regressive parameter (γ̂) and slope parameters of the LSDVC
model, as given by Equation 1.36, are reported in this section. The main estimated
parameters of interest are β̂1 and β̂2. The proposition of the model in Section 1.3
implies that β̂1 + β̂2, which represents the effect of the variations in the lagged
industry-specific ERER measures on the variations in current industry-level R&D
expenditures in low pass-through industries, is statistically significant and of nega-
tive sign.
As expected, the estimation results reported in Table 61.7 (column I ) suggest
that lagged changes in R&D expenditures do not contribute to the current changes
in those expenditures. More importantly, the lagged ERER measures are nega-
tively correlated with current R&D expenditures only in the industries with low
pass-through elasticities: while the estimated parameter of interest for the high
pass-through industries (i.e. the slope parameter associated with ∆ERERi,t−1)
is statistically insignificant, the estimated parameter for the low pass-through in-
dustries (i.e. the sum of the slope parameters associated with ∆ERERi,t−1 and
Di ∗ ∆ERERi,t−1) is statistically significant and of negative sign.33 The results
also imply that an increase in industry-level output is positively correlated with the
industry-level R&D expenditure. Yet, the variations in interest rate are not corre-
lated with the variations in R&D expenditures.34 Controlling for the export shares,
I find no significant correlation between the variations in export intensity and R&D
33Testing the following hypothesis: H0 : β1 + β2 = 0, the P-value turns out to be equal to
0.0064.
34This pattern also emerges in the above LSDVC results.
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expenditures.
These results indicate that the negative correlation between the variations in
industry-specific ERER measures and R&D expenditures (as reported in Table 41.7
and Table 51.7, for instance) are driven by the industries with relatively large firms
wherein pass-through elasticities are expected be quite low. As illustrated in Figure
51.7, these industries include Precision, Radio, TV & Comm. Eq., Metal, Motor
Veh., Fabricated Metal, Other Trans., Office Mach., and Coke, Petroleum & Nuc
Fuel.
I also use the regression function in Equation 1.36 to test some of the alternative
hypotheses, described in Section 1.2. In particular, I am interested in the hypothe-
ses developed by Zietz and Fayissa (1994) and Funk (2003).
When it comes to industry-level heterogeneities in R&D activities, the findings
in Zietz and Fayissa (1994) imply that there exists a negative correlation between
the variations in the lagged industry-specific ERER measure and R&D expenditures
in the R&D-intensive industries.35 I am able to test this hypothesis by changing
the definition of the indicator variable in Equation 1.36. Let Di be equal to one
for those industries that on average contribute to more than 2% of the total R&D
expenditures in the sample, and zero otherwise. As illustrated in Figure 21.7, the
R&D-intensive industries include: Metal, Elec. Mach. n.e.c., Office Mach., Other
Trans., Mach. & Eq. n.e.c., Chemical, Motor Veh., and Radio, TV & Comm. Eq.
The indicator variable being defined as above, the hypothesis in Zietz and Fayissa
(1994) implies that β̂1 +β̂2, which represents the effect of the variations in the lagged
industry-specific ERER measures on the variations in current industry-level R&D
expenditures in the R&D-intensive industries, is statistically significant and of neg-
ative sign. The results reported in Table 61.7 (column II ) are supportive of their
35Zietz and Fayissa (1994) find that R&D-intensive firms increase their R&D expenditures follow-
ing an exchange rate appreciations. Yet, Scherer and Huh (1992) find that greater high-technology
import competition, which may be caused by exchange rate appreciation, has an adverse effect on
the relative size of R&D activities.
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hypothesis.36
When it comes to industry-level heterogeneities in exporting activities, the find-
ings in Funk (2003) imply that the R&D expenditures in export-intensive industries
do not respond significantly to an appreciation in the lagged industry-specific ERER
measure, but they respond positively to a depreciation. Though I do not test this
asymmetric effect directly, I test for the overall effect of the changes in the lagged
industry-specific ERER measure on the R&D expenditures in export-intensive in-
dustries by changing the definition of the indicator variable in Equation 1.36. Let
Di be equal to one for those industries that on average have an export intensity
more than 30%, and zero otherwise. The export-intensive industries include: Mo-
tor Veh., Leather, Precision, Textile, Radio, TV & Comm. Eq., Other Trans.,
and Office Mach. As reported in Table 61.7 (column III ), the lagged variations in
the industry-specific ERER measures are negatively correlated with R&D expendi-
tures in the export-intensive industries. This correlation is statistically significant.37
There are some empirical evidence that predict such correlations. In particular, the
findings in Basile (2001) suggest that an exchange rate depreciation would reduce
the importance of technological competitiveness in the firms’ export decisions. This
may imply that (continuing) exporters have less incentives to invest in the R&D
capabilities due to greater price competitiveness, which in turn predicts the above
negative correlation.
Thus, testing for the hypothesis developed by Zietz and Fayissa (1994) and Funk
(2003), I find that an increase in price competitiveness has an adverse effect on the
R&D expenditures in the R&D- and export-intensive industries. For the other in-
dustries the correlation is statistically insignificant. The problem, however, is that
R&D-intensive industries tend to be highly export-intensive as well. In order of their
36Testing the following hypothesis: H0 : β1 + β2 = 0, the P-value turns out to be equal to
0.0027.
37Testing the following hypothesis: H0 : β1 + β2 = 0, the P-value turns out to be equal to
0.0042.
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contribution to the aggregate R&D, these industries include: Radio, TV & Comm.
Eq., Motor Veh., Chemical, Mach. & Eq. n.e.c., Other Trans., Office Mach., Elec.
Mach. n.e.c., and Metal. This makes it very challenging for us to identify the extent
to which innovative and exporting activities affect the relationship between relative
national prices and R&D expenditures.38 This, in practice, reinforces the impor-
tance of the industry-level heterogeneities that are generated by the pass-through
elasticities.
1.5 Conclusion
This study examines how changes in relative national prices affect innovation in-
put in a small open economy. For this purpose, I introduce a parsimonious partial
equilibrium model of R&D investment, which builds on the framework developed
by Campa and Goldberg (1999). Under some regularity conditions about the ex-
change rate pass-through elasticities, the model predicts that an increase in price
competitiveness has an adverse effect on R&D expenditures. In particular, this
adverse effect is expected to be observed in the industries that tend to have low
pass-through elasticities.
In order to test for the direction of responses, I make use of a panel of industry-
level R&D and industry-specific effective real exchange rate data in Korea. First, I
employ Panel Vector Autoregressive estimation technique to estimate the effect of
an industry-specific effective real exchange rate depreciation on industry-level R&D
expenditures. Given the preliminary evidence of the Panel Vector Autoregressive
estimations, I re-estimate the empirical relationship of interest employing Corrected
Least Square with Dummy Variables estimation technique, which is widely known
to perform better when the cross-section and time-series dimensions are relatively
38I also entertain another hypothesis based on the heterogeneities in import penetration. The
results are inconclusive, however. Detailed estimation results available upon request.
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small. The empirical findings support the main prediction of the model indicating
that a lagged depreciation in effective real exchange rate has an adverse effect on
industrial R&D expenditures.
I also explore the industry-level heterogeneities that are caused by the differ-
ences in pass-through behavior, innovative efforts, and exporting activities. The
significant adverse effect of a depreciation in industry-specific real exchange rate on
R&D expenditures in the R&D- and export-intensive industries notwithstanding,
the main contribution of this paper is to explore the heterogeneities that are caused
by pass-through elasticities across different industries. The results indicate that a
depreciation of industry-specific real exchange rate has a significant adverse effect
on R&D expenditures in those industries wherein firms are of relatively large size.
These firms tend to have lower pass-through elasticities (e.g. Berman et al., 2012;
Chatterjee et al., 2013; Amiti et al., 2014). Given their export shares, these firms
are more likely to cut their R&D expenditures in response to an increase in price
competitiveness, as predicted by the main proposition of the model.
The industries that are likely to have low pass-through elasticities include: Preci-
sion, Radio, TV & Comm. Eq., Metal, Motor Veh., Fabricated Metal, Other Trans.,
Office Mach., and Coke, Petroleum & Nuc Fuel. Five of these industries (notably,
Radio, TV & Comm. Eq, Metal, Motor Veh., Other Trans., and Office Mach.)
happen to be R&D- and export-intensive as well. On average, these five industries
contribute to more than 58% of the entire manufacturing R&D in Korea, and three
of them export more than half of their production. It is not surprising, therefore,
that I find these industries to drive the underlying empirical relationship of interest.
Particularly, the significant adverse effect of an increase in price competitiveness
on the R&D expenditures is evident in two of these five industries: Other Trans.
and Office Mach. Interestingly enough, though these two industries contribute to
about 8% of manufacturing R&D, they are both highly export intensive (their ex-
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port share is about 55% and 71%, respectively) and highly concentrated (only the
Coke, Petroleum & Nuc Fuel industry shows greater concentration that these two
industries). This indicates how important exporting activities and pass-through
elasticities are in moderating the relationship between relative national prices and
R&D expenditures.
These findings imply that an increase in price competitiveness, as measured by
an industry-specific effective real exchange rate depreciation, has a negative effect
on the amount of resources that are allocated to innovative activities, particularly
in the industries with relatively low pass-through. As illustrated by the main propo-
sition of the model, this is due to the fact that the price adjustments in response
to the changes in exchange rate are not large enough to mitigate the changes in
innovation input prices. Given these findings, further research may provide more
insights about how firms choose between different types of investment (e.g. invest-
ment in capital goods vs. investment in innovative capabilities) when they gain price
competitiveness due to exogenous changes in spot exchange rate. It may also be in-
teresting to examine whether firms react to depreciation and appreciation differently
when it comes to their relative resource allocation into different types of investments.
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1.6 Derivations
1.6.1 A.1
In this appendix, I derive the conditions that govern the optimal quantities which
are produced by firm j for its domestic and foreign markets (Qdj,t
∗
and Qfj,t
∗
) as well
as the optimal domestic and foreign inputs that are employed by this firm (ldj,t
∗
and
lfj,t
∗
). The profit function is as follows:
Πj,t = max
{Qdj,t,Qfj,t,ldj,t,lfj,t}
{Gd(Rj,t)(
P dj,t
Pt
)Qdj,t+G
f (Rj,t)(
StP
f
j,t
Pt
)Qfj,t−(
W dt
Pt
)ldj,t−(
StW
f
t
Pt
)lfj,t}
(1.37)
Given Equation 1.2, the NFOC for the optimal quantity produced for the do-
mestic market is as follows:
∂Πj,t
∂Qj,t
d
=[Gd(Rj,t)(
P dj,t
Pt
) +Gd(Rj,t)Q
d
j,t ×
∂
∂Qj,t
d
(
P dj,t
Pt
)]− (1.38)
[Gf (Rj,t)(
StP
f
j,t
Pt
) +Gf (Rj,t)Q
d
j,t ×
∂
∂Qj,t
d
(
StP
f
j,t
Pt
)] = 0
Let αdj,t and α
f
j,t be the slope parameters:
αdj,d,t :=
∂
∂Qj,t
d
(
P dj,t
Pt
) (1.39)
αfj,d,t :=
∂
∂Qj,t
d
(
StP
f
j,t
Pt
) (1.40)
The optimal quantity produced for the domestic market is as follows:
Qdj,t
∗
= −
P dj,t
Pt
− (Gf (Rj,t)/Gd(Rj,t))StP
f
j,t
Pt
αdj,d,t − (Gf (Rj,t)/Gd(Rj,t))αfj,d,t
(1.41)
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Qdj,t
∗
is upward-sloping in
P dj,t
Pt
provided that αdj,d,t < (G
f (Rj,t)/G
d(Rj,t))α
f
j,d,t.
Analogous to the result above, the optimal quantity produced for the foreign
market is as follows:
Qfj,t
∗
= −
StP
f
j,t
Pt
− (Gd(Rj,t)/Gf (Rj,t))P
d
j,t
Pt
αfj,f,t − (Gd(Rj,t)/Gf (Rj,t))αdj,f,t
(1.42)
Qfj,t
∗
is upward-sloping in
StP
f
j,t
Pt
provided that αfj,f,t < (G
d(Rj,t)/G
f (Rj,t))α
d
j,f,t.
The NFOC for the optimal employment of the domestic input is as follows:
∂Πj,t
∂lj,t
d
= [Gd(Rj,t)(
P dj,t
Pt
) +Gf (Rj,t)(
StP
f
j,t
Pt
)]
∂Qj,t
∂lj,t
d
− W
d
t
Pt
= 0 (1.43)
The domestic input is, therefore, employed by firm j up to the point where its
marginal cost is equal to the realized value of its marginal productivity given the
stock of its R&D capability. Analogous condition governs the employment of the
foreign input.
1.6.2 A.2
In this appendix, I describe the derivation of the condition reported in Equation 1.11.
The intertemporal optimization problem is given by Equation 1.4, which can be
written as:
Vt = Πj,t −RD∗j,t + Vt+1 = Πj,t −
P di,t
Pt
IRj,t
∗ − ψ
2
(
P di,t
Pt
IRj,t
∗
)2 + Vt+1 (1.44)
Assuming that firm j ’s demand for R&D inputs has no impact on the price of
R&D inputs (i.e. ∂
∂IRj,t
(
P di,t
Pt
) = 0), the NFOC governing the intertemporal optimiza-
tion is as follows:
∂Vt
∂IRj,t
∗ =
∂Π∗j,t
∂IRj,t
∗ −
P di,t
Pt
− ψ(P
d
i,t
Pt
)2IRj,t
∗
+
∂Vt+1
∂IRj,t
∗ = 0 (1.45)
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The first term in Equation 1.45 is equal to zero since firm j ’s profit (as defined
by Equation 1.1) depends on its R&D capabilities (as given by Equation 1.3) and
not its current investment in R&D input. However, the investment in R&D inputs
at time t changes the stock of R&D capabilities as from time t+1. With no further
investments, the changes in the R&D capabilities at time t+τ (τ ≥ 1) is equal to
the changes in R&D capabilities at time t+1. This implies that: dIRj,t = dRj,t+1 =
dRj,t+τ ; τ ≥ 1. Thus, the partial derivative of the value function at time t+1 with
respect to the investments made at time t (i.e. ∂Vt+1/∂I
R
j,t
∗
) is equal to the partial
derivative of the value function at time t+1 with respect to the stock of R&D capa-
bilities at time t+1 (i.e. ∂Vt+1/∂Rj,t+1), which is equal to the expected discounted
present value of the stream of future marginal profitability of R&D capabilities
(henceforth, EMPRj,t):
EMPRj,t :=
∂Vt+1
∂IRj,t
∗ =
∂Vt+1
∂Rj,t+1
= E{
∞∑
τ=1
βτ (
∂Πj,t+τ
∂Rj,t+τ
)} (1.46)
Given Equation 1.45, the above implies:
IRj,t
∗
=
1
ψ
[(
1
P di,t
Pt
)2E{
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [
∂Πt+τ
∂Rt+τ
]} − 1
P di,t
Pt
] (1.47)
1.6.3 A.3
In this appendix, I describe the derivation of the condition by which the demand
for innovation inputs (as given by Equation 1.11) is downward-sloping. The partial
derivative of IRj,t
∗
with respect to
P di,t
Pt
is as follows:
∂IRj,t
∗
∂(
P di,t
Pt
)
=
1
ψ
[−2( 1
P di,t
Pt
)3EMPRj,t + (
1
P di,t
Pt
)2] (1.48)
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Among other results, the derivations in Appendix 1.6.2 show that EMPRj,t is
not a function of
P di,t
Pt
. With this in mind, I obtain the following results:
sign{ ∂I
R
j,t
∗
∂(
P di,t
Pt
)
} = sign{1− 2(EMPRj,t
P di,t
Pt
)} (1.49)
The demand for innovation inputs is decreasing in their prices when the ex-
pected discounted present value of future marginal profitability of R&D capabilities
(EMPRj,t) is large enough, such that
EMPRj,t
Pd
i,t
Pt
> 0.5.
1.6.4 A.4
In this appendix, I describe the derivations that lead to Equations 1.12 and 1.15.
Let us start with the marginal profitability of R&D capabilities:
∂Πj,t+τ
∂Rj,t+τ
= (1.50)
∂
∂Rj,t+τ
[Gd(Rj,t+τ )
P dj,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qdj,t+τ+G
f (Rj,t+τ )
St+τP
f
j,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qfj,t+τ−(
W dt+τ
Pt+τ
)ldj,t+τ−(
St+τW
f
t+τ
Pt+τ
)lfj,t+τ ]
The probability density functions gd(Rj,t+τ ) and g
f (Rj,t+τ ) being defined as in
Equations 1.13 and 1.14, I obtain the following:
∂Πt+τ
∂Rj,t+τ
= gd(Rj,t+τ )
P dj,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qdj,t+τ + g
f (Rj,t+τ )
St+τP
f
j,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qfj,t+τ (1.51)
As defined by Equation 1.46, the expected discounted present value of future
marginal profitability of R&D capabilities (EMPRj,t) can be written as:
EMPRj,t = E{
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [gd(Rj,t+τ )
P dj,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qdj,t+τ + g
f (Rj,t+τ )
St+τP
f
j,t+τ
Pt+τ
Qfj,t+τ ]} (1.52)
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Since the spot exchange rate is the only source of uncertainty, I can simplify
Equation 1.52 even further:
EMPRj,t =
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
E(St+τ )P
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t] (1.53)
Since the changes in exchange rate are permanent (i.e. E(St+τ ) = St; τ ≥ 1), I
obtain the following:
EMPRj,t =
∞∑
τ=1
βτ [gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t] (1.54)
Given Equation 1.47, firm j ’s optimal investment in R&D inputs is as follows:
IRj,t
∗
=
1
ψ
[(
1
P di,t
Pt
)2(
β
1− β )(g
d(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t)−
1
P di,t
Pt
] (1.55)
1.6.5 A.5
In this appendix, I describe the derivation of the profit-maximizing price of R&D
equipment set by monopolist i, as given by Equation 1.18. For this purpose, I
assume a simple production function:
IRt = A.mi,t (1.56)
In this production function, A is a time-invariant productivity measure, and mi,t
is the input used in producing R&D equipment. Given the market demand facing
monopolist i (as given by Equation 1.16), the profit function is as follows:
Πi,t = max
{P
d
i,t
Pt
}
{P
d
i,t
Pt
IRt −
StP
f
i,t
Pt
mi,t} (1.57)
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The NFOC governing the optimal monopoly price is as follows:
∂Πi,t
∂(
P di,t
Pt
)
= −Ωt − 1
A
(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
)(
−2Ωt +N(P
d
i,t
Pt
)
P di,t
Pt
) (1.58)
In the above condition, N is the number of firms across the J industries, and Ωt is
the sum of the marginal profitability of R&D capabilities (as given by Equation 1.17).
Under the above NFOC, I obtain the following:
P di,t
Pt
∗
=
2Ωt(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
)
AΩt +N(
StP
f
i,t
Pt
)
(1.59)
1.6.6 A.6
In this appendix, I describe the derivation of the sign for the partial derivative of
R&D expenditures with respect to the changes in the spot exchange rates (i.e.
sign{∂RD∗j,t
∂St
}). The partial derivative of R&D expenditures, as given by Equa-
tion 1.20, with respect to the changes in the spot exchange rates is as follows:
∂RD∗j,t
∂St
=(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )
∂yt
∂St
+
ψ
2
[(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )]
2[
∂
∂St
(y2t )− 2(
1− β
β
)
∂yt
∂St
] (1.60)
=
∂yt
∂St
[(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β ) +
ψ
2
[(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )]
2(2yt − 2(1− β
β
))]
=
∂yt
∂St
[(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β ) + ψ((
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β ))
2yt − ψ(( 1
ψ
)(
β
1− β ))
2(
1− β
β
)]
=
∂yt
∂St
(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )(1 +
β
1− β yt − 1)
=
∂yt
∂St
(
1
ψ
)(
β
1− β )
2yt
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Since ( 1
ψ
)( β
1−β )
2yt is positive, the sign for
∂RD∗j,t
∂St
is the same as the sign for ∂yt
∂St
.
Given Equation 1.21, the partial derivative of yt with respect to St is as follows:
∂yt
∂St
=−( 1
P di,t
Pt
)2(
∂
∂St
(
P di,t
Pt
))(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t) (1.61)
+
1
P di,t
Pt
(
∂
∂St
(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t))
=(
1
P di,t
Pt
){gd(Rj,t)( ∂
∂St
(
P dj,t
Pt
))Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)(
∂
∂St
(
P fj,t
Pt
))StQ
f
j,t + g
f (Rj,t)
P fj,t
Pt
Qfj,t
− ( 1
P di,t
Pt
)(
∂
∂St
(
P di,t
Pt
))(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t)}
Multiplying the partial derivatives of firm j ’s price measures with respect to spot
exchange rate (i.e.
∂(P cj,t/Pt)
∂St
) by unity (as given by (St
St
)(
P cj,t/Pt
P cj,t/Pt
)) for c ∈ {d, f} and
repeating the same exercise for monopolist i ’s price measure, I re-write the above
equation in terms of the pass-through price elasticities (as defined by Equations 1.23-
1.25):
∂yt
∂St
=(
1
St
)(
1
P di,t
Pt
){ηdj,tgd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + η
f
j,tg
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t(1.62)
− ηi,t(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t)}
I obtain the following assuming that ηfj,t is equal to η
d
j,t (i.e. η
f
j,t = η
d
j,t = ηj,t):
∂yt
∂St
= (
1
St
)(
1
P di,t
Pt
){(ηj,t−ηi,t)(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t+g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t)+g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t}
(1.63)
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Given the result above, the following holds since the terms ( 1
St
)( 1
Pd
i,t
Pt
) is always
positive:
sign{∂RD
∗
t
∂St
} =sign{ ∂yt
∂St
} (1.64)
=sign{(ηj,t − ηi,t)(gd(Rj,t)
P dj,t
Pt
Qdj,t + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t) + g
f (Rj,t)
StP
f
j,t
Pt
Qfj,t}
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Changes in real manufacturing R&D index and changes in the aggregate ERER
index in Korea. The index is equal to 1 for the year 2000 (Sources: OECD (2012) and
IFS (2013))
Figure 2: The average industry shares in aggregate manufacturing R&D expenditures in
Korea (1995-2004) (Source: author’s computation using OECD (2012))
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Table 1: The industries used in the sample along with their average R&D contributions
(Source: author’s computation using OECD (2012))
ISIC KSIC Industry 
Average R&D 
Expenditure in 
Current PPP 
dollar (1995-
2004) 
Average Real 
R&D 
Expenditure in 
won 
 (1995-2004) 
Average 
Industry Share 
in R&D 
Expenditure  
(1995-2004) 
   (Million) (Million)  
C15T16 D15 Food products, beverages 
and tobacco 
192 148,870 1.67% 
C17T18 D17,D18 Textiles and textile 
products 
80 59,163 0.66% 
C19 D19 Leather, leather products 
and footwear 
13 10,745 0.12% 
C21T22 D21 Pulp, paper, paper 
products, printing and 
publishing 
52 3,9323 0.44% 
C23 D23 Coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel 
166 115,017 1.29% 
C24 D24 Chemicals and chemical 
products 
954 747,273 8.40% 
C25 D25 Rubber and plastics 
products 
182 144,566 1.62% 
C26 D26 Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
116 91,715 1.03% 
C27 D27 Basic metals 226 185,317 2.08% 
C28 D28 Fabricated metal products, 
exc. machinery and 
equipment 
90 70,230 0.79% 
C29 D29 Machinery and equipment, 
n.e.c. 
603 471,087 5.30% 
C30 D30 Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
421 316,469 3.56% 
C31 D31 
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus, n.e.c. 
251 206,639 2.32% 
C32 D32a 
Radio, television and 
communication equipment 
3,565 2,626,988 29.55% 
C33 D33 
Medical, precision and 
optical instruments 
161 122,069 1.37% 
C34 D34 
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
2,220 1,683,893 18.94% 
C35 D35 Other transport equipment 472 377,418 4.24% 
 
52
Figure 3: Industry-specific and aggregate ERER variations (Source: industry-specific
ERER measures are computed by Lee and Yi (2005), and the aggregate ERER measure
(dashed-line) is computed by Darvas (2012))
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Figure 4: Changes in real manufacturing R&D index and the industry-specific ERER
index in selected industries. The index is equal to 1 for the year 2000 (Sources: OECD
(2012) and Lee and Yi (2005))
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Figure 5: Hirschman-Herfindahl Index * 10000 in 1997 (Source: OECD (2004))
Table 2: PVAR estimations
 I   II  
 rndi,t   Δrndi,t  
rndi,t-1  0.619***  Δrndi,t-1  -0.051  
 (0.129)   (0.070)  
ERERi,t-1 -0.723**  ΔERERi,t-1 -1.372**  
 (0.323)   (0.627)  
T-billt-1 -0.027  ΔT-billt-1 0.020  
 (0.019)   (0.035)  
yi,t-1 0.249  Δyi,t-1 0.259  
 (0.203)   (0.267)  
No. of obs. 136  No. of obs. 119  
VD (a) 6.8%  VD (a) 5.9%  
AIC  -1.90783  AIC -1.54931  
D (b)  0.243357  D (b) 0.42069  
NOTE: 
(a) The reported Variance Decomposition (VD) illustrates the percentage of 
variation in R&D expenditures explained by the variation in the ERER 
measures. 
(b) The differences between the AIC in a model with two lags and the AIC in a 
model with one lag are reported in row D. A positive value implies that the 
model with one lag outperforms the model with two lags.  
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis; P<0.001 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 * 
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Figure 6: Impulse response function using the esimation results reported in Table 2,
column II
Table 3: LSDVC estimations using level variations
 I II III 
 rndi,t rndi,t rndi,t 
rndi,t-1 0.813*** 0.824*** 0.845*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) 
ERERi,t-1 -0.850** -0.855** -0.556 
 (0.370) (0.370) (0.659) 
yi,t 0.255* 0.295** 0.306 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.199) 
T-billt -0.020 -0.004 -0.017 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) 
Year 
indicators 
No No Yes 
Crisis 
indicators 
No Yes (a) No 
No. of obs. 153 153 153 
NOTE: 
(a) The estimated coefficient for the crisis indicator (which is equal to 
one for the years 1997 and 1998) is statistically insignificant. 
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis 
P<0.001 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 * 
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Table 4: LSDVC estimations using first-difference variations
 I II III 
 Δrndi,t Δrndi,t Δrndi,t 
Δrndi,t-1 -0.049 -0.048 -0.052 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.095) 
ΔERERi,t-1 -1.270*** -1.392*** -2.285** 
 (0.399) (0.435) (0.917) 
Δyt 0.404** 0.388* 0.385* 
 (0.201) (0.202) (0.219) 
ΔT-billt -0.034 -0.049 -0.047 
 (0.026) (0.039) (0.039) 
Year 
indicators 
No No Yes 
Crisis 
indicators 
No Yes (a) No 
No. of obs. 136 136 136 
NOTE: 
(a) The estimated coefficient for the crisis indicator (which is equal to 
one for the years 1997 and 1998) is statistically insignificant. 
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis 
P<0.001 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 * 
 
 
 
Table 5: LSDVC estimations using first-difference variations in R&D, ERER, and output
along with level variations in the interest rate
 I II III 
 Δrndi,t Δrndi,t Δrndi,t 
Δrndi,t-1 -0.045 -0.041 -0.052 
 (0.088) (0.091) (0.095) 
ΔERERi,t-1 -1.114*** -1.139*** -2.285** 
 (0.369) (0.380) (0.917) 
Δyt 0.336* 0.374* 0.385* 
 (0.193) (0.202) (0.219) 
T-billt -0.002 0.016 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.019) 
Year 
indicators 
No No Yes 
Crisis 
indicators 
No Yes (a) No 
No. of obs. 136 136 136 
NOTE: 
(a) The estimated coefficient for the crisis indicator (which is equal to 
one for the years 1997 and 1998) is statistically insignificant. 
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis 
P<0.001 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 * 
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Table 6: Exploring heterogeneities - LSDVC estimations using first-difference variations
in R&D, ERER, output, and export share along with level variations in the interest rate
 I II III 
 Δrndi,t Δrndi,t Δrndi,t 
Δrndi,t-1 -0.082 -0.050 -0.064 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.097) 
ΔERERi,t-1 -0.407 -1.119 -1.367 
 (1.207) (1.149) (1.186) 
Di *ΔERERi,t-1 -2.034** -1.603* -1.262 
 (0.837) (0.818) (0.868) 
Δyt 0.367* 0.386* 0.397* 
 (0.218) (0.216) (0.218) 
T-billt -0.008 0.001 0.000 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Δxt 0.004 0.001 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year 
indicators 
Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 136 136 136 
P-Value for  
H0: β1+β2=0 0.0064 0.0027 0.0042 
NOTE: Di is an indicator variable. In column I, Di is equal to one for 
highly concentrated industries (i.e. HHI1997>100), wherein pass-
through elasticities are expected to be low. In column II, Di is equal to 
one for R&D intensive industries (i.e. Ave. R&D Share>0.02). In 
column III, Di is equal to one for highly export intensive industries 
(i.e. Ave. Export Intensity>0.3).  
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis 
P<0.001 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 * 
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of Trade
in Innovative Tasks on Innovation Output
2.1 Introduction
Recent developments in task trade have raised new questions in applied inter-
national economics. Firms’ incentives to distribute different tasks across the globe
and the gains that are realized from global task distribution are of importance not
only for Multinational Corporations (MNCs), but also for policy makers. The rela-
tive size of trade in tasks and the fact that intra-firm trade in services has recently
become more important encourage us to revisit some fairly old questions in inter-
national economics with regard to the distribution of resources and the gains from
openness.
Multinational production and intra-firm trade in services remain very interest-
ing when we focus on trade in innovative tasks. This specific task trade refers to
the performance of research and development (R&D) activities and other innovative
tasks (e.g. design and engineering activities) in foreign countries through foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) or contracts and arms length agreements. Two stylized facts
motivate the importance of trade in innovative tasks. First, innovation activities
carried out by MNCs account for a relatively large portion of innovation input in
advanced economies. In 2010, for example, the R&D performed by American multi-
national parent companies, which exceeds 212.5 billion dollars, was more than 75%
of the entire R&D performed by businesses in the United States (National Science
Board 2014). Second, multinational production has been an important driving force
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behind the internationalization of innovative activities. In 2010, the majority-owned
foreign affiliates of American MNCs performed 39.5 billion dollars of R&D abroad
(National Science Board 2014).
This task distribution is not unique to American MNCs. Within the countries
in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it is
estimated that more than 16% of the industrial R&D in 2004 was conducted by
foreign affiliates (Dunning and Lundan 2009). More specifically, as discussed by
Moncada-Paterno-Castello, Voigt, and Vivarelli (2011), European MNCs play an
important role in this task distribution. In 2010, for example, the R&D performed
in the United States by American affiliates of European firms (from Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, Germany and France) reached 26 billion dollars, which was close
to two-thirds of the entire R&D done by the majority-owned affiliates of foreign
MNCs in the United States (National Science Board 2014).
Given the size and growing importance of such off-shore activities, in this study
I specifically examine how trade in innovative tasks impacts the overall amount of
innovation that firms conduct. Using survey data, I measure this overall innovation
in two ways: 1.) by the propensity to innovate as given by a firm’s formal disclo-
sure of innovation, which captures the extensive margin of innovation, and 2.) by
the relative size of innovation output given by the innovative product sales in total
turnover, which captures the intensive margin of innovation. Trade in innovative
tasks is measured by off-shoring R&D, design and engineering activities.
In this context, simple regression models are likely to suffer from reverse causal-
ity. One can identify at least two channels for this. On the one hand, innovative
firms are likely to be among the firms that have developed relatively high innovation
capabilities within the firm, and may depend less on external entities for their inno-
vation efforts. For instance, firms with innovative products are likely to be in-house
R&D-performers and may have no reason to out-source/off-shore their innovative
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tasks to other firms, R&D centers, or universities.1 The first channel for reverse
causality is, therefore, the following: firms with relatively better innovation output
are likely to have access to superior in-house innovation input and depend less on
off-shored innovation. On the other hand, firms with superior productivity are more
likely to engage in off-shore activities (e.g. Antra`s and Helpman 2004). Under a
Schumpeterian frame-work, however, this superior productivity may well be the re-
sult of the firms’ innovative efforts. This sets the stage for another reverse causality
channel: those firms that off-shore their innovative tasks are, in fact, likely to be
the most innovative firms to begin with. Therefore, under the first channel, greater
innovation output is expected to reduce the likelihood of trade in innovative tasks,
whereas under the second channel innovative firms are likely to be among the firms
that partake in trade in innovative tasks.
To address this reverse causality, I make use of a recent European firm-level
survey and employ different instrumental variable (IV) estimation techniques. The
survey in use provides cross-section observations on different characteristics of a
rather large group of firms, thus accommodating the IV estimations.
From the full sample of surveyed firms, which includes domestic firms and MNCs,
I am able to identify those MNCs that partake in trade in innovative tasks. Using
this information, I first estimate the effects of trade in innovative tasks on the ex-
tensive margin of innovation, measured by whether or not a firm has disclosed its
innovation. I then estimate the effects of trade in innovative tasks on the intensive
margin of firm-level innovation, measured by the share of innovative product sales
in total turnover of the firms. Studying the intensive margin as well as the extensive
margin is an important step taken in this paper, which offers new insights with
regard to the impact of trade in innovative tasks on innovation output.
1This prediction is based on an implicit assumption that external innovative activities are substi-
tutes for in-house innovative efforts. Hagedoorn and Wang (2012) suggest that the substitutability
between internal and external R&D activities is evident at relatively low amounts of in-house R&D
investments.
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Controlling for a wide range of observables and employing the relevant IV meth-
ods, the estimation results suggest that off-shoring innovative tasks is beneficial on
both margins: it increases the propensity to innovate, and it increases the share
of innovative product sales in total turnover. The results also suggest that simple
baseline regressions may underestimate the effect of trade in innovative tasks on
innovation output. Based on the IV estimations, those firms that off-shore their
R&D, design and engineering activities are 60% more likely to successfully innovate
as measured by disclosed innovation, and the average share of innovative product
sales in their turnover is 35% greater than other firms that do not off-shore those
innovative tasks.
This paper is part of an ongoing and relatively recent set of empirical investi-
gations on the determinants of firm-level innovation.2 A number of studies have
examined how different firm and industry characteristics such as firm/business-unit
size (e.g. Cohen and Klepper 1996), competition (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005), export-
ing activities (e.g. Lileeva and Trefler 2010), and financial constraints (e.g. Hall
2002) affect innovation input, output, and productivity. Beyond these canonical
predictors, the impact of trade in tasks on innovation input and output is among
the recent empirical questions that have been raised in the innovation literature.
Several studies (e.g. Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter 2010; Lin and Lin 2010;
Dachs et al. 2013; Hufbauer, Moran, and Oldenski 2013) have examined the im-
pacts of off-shoring production on innovation. Regardless of the type of tasks that
are performed off-shore, these studies explore the impacts of trade in tasks on firms’
innovative performance. There are also a number of studies that are focused on
trade in specific types of tasks. Some of these studies have looked at the indirect
impacts of non-innovative task distribution on innovation output (e.g. Go¨rg and
Hanley 2008), and some have examined the direct links between off-shoring inno-
2Cohen (2010) provides an exhaustive review of the empirical findings on the determinants of
firms’ innovation activities as well as industry-level innovation.
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vative tasks and innovation output (e.g. Nieto and Rodriguez 2011). Using a new
and novel European manufacturing dataset, this paper contributes to the latter by
studying the existence and the magnitude of the effect of trade in innovative tasks
on the extensive as well as the intensive margins of innovation.
Among those who study trade in innovative tasks, Kotabe et al. (2007) study the
impact of international knowledge content on innovative performance of 53 American
pharmaceutical firms using the data on their patents in the United States. Depend-
ing on its level, they find that international knowledge content affects the innovation
output positively but with diminishing returns. Compared to their study, this pa-
per examines a sample that represents the manufacturing sector in general and is
capable of evaluating the effect of transferring international knowledge on disclosed
innovation among European MNCs. Ceci and Masciarelli (2010) also study how
trade in knowledge-intensive tasks (e.g. R&D, design and software development)
affects firms’ performance. Using a large sample of Italian firms, they find that off-
shoring those tasks has a positive impact on the return on equity and also the return
on sales. They argue that the coherence between the off-shored knowledge-intensive
activities and the downstream activities is crucial for the firms to gain from this
task trade. In contrast to the performance measures used in their study, this paper
focuses on innovation output and captures the impact of off-shoring knowledge-
intensive tasks on the share of innovative product sales in total turnover.
Nieto and Rodriguez (2011) examine the impact of trade in innovative tasks on
the propensity to innovate as measured by product versus process innovation using
a large sample of Spanish firms. They find that trade in R&D tasks positively af-
fects innovative performance of the firms, but the impacts are greater for product
innovation. Although the type of data and the identification strategy in this paper
are different, the estimation results for the types of innovative activities that are
affected by these task trades can be compared to the empirical findings reported by
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Nieto and Rodriguez (2011). The data set in use here comes from a more represen-
tative European sample. Compared to the way that innovative firms are identified
in Nieto and Rodriguez (2011), I make use of a more restrictive criterion, as given by
disclosed innovation, to study the impacts on the extensive margin. The information
on firms’ product and/or process innovation are then used to study whether trade
in innovative tasks has different impacts on different types of innovation output.
Beyond the impacts on the extensive margin of innovation, this paper also studies
whether off-shoring innovative tasks contributes to the share of innovative product
sales in total turnover, and provides an estimate of the magnitude of this effect.
The data are discussed more fully in Section 2, while the empirical analyses are
described in Section 3. Section 4 provides further discussions. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data
Firm-level observations used in this study come from the European Firms in a
Global Economy (EFIGE) survey.3 This is a new and novel survey, which represents
manufacturing activities across different countries in Europe. There are 14,759 firms
in this sample from 7 European countries and 11 industrial sectors. Roughly speak-
ing, France, Germany, Italy and Spain each make up a bit less than 20% share of
the sample. the United Kingdom has 15% share, and Austria and Hungry each have
close to 3% share. For any given firm, a randomized industry identifier is given.
The main economic activity of a firm, classified based on Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy,
is also reported.4
Barba Navaretti et al. (2011, pp. 57-60) report detailed comparisons between
3The EFIGE survey has been conducted by Bruegel, a European think tank, along with seven
other partners, and it is supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commis-
sion.
4These two classifications are non-nested. There are some sectors for which more than one type
of economic activity has been reported. See Appendix 1 for more details on the distribution of
firms across countries by sector (Table A-1) and by economic activity (Table A-2). The sectors are
also listed in Table A-3.
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the sector and the size distribution of the stratified sample in the EFIGE survey
and the reference populations across different countries, showing that the sample is
fairly representative. Yet, firms with fewer than 10 employees are excluded from the
survey. These firms are typically small businesses that are actively involved in the
domestic market rather than foreign markets. Hence, internationally active firms are
over-represented in this survey. To correct for this, I make use of a weighting scheme
proposed by Barba Navaretti et al. (2011) and used by Altomonte, Aquilante, and
Ottaviano (2012).5
The data were collected from January to May 2010, with questions covering the
years from 2007 to 2009. However, information was mostly collected as a cross-
section for the last available budget year (2008) along with some information with
regard to averages for the period 2007-9. The respondents are typically of high rank
in the organization: CEO, General Director, President, CFO, or HR Manager.
To assess the effects from trade in innovative tasks on innovation output, I first
need a set of measures for innovation output. In the survey, firm managers have
answered some general questions with regard to innovation in the output and pro-
duction process. For instance, one can identify if a firm has disclosed any innovations
by applying for a patent, registering an industrial design, registering a trade mark
or claiming copyright during 2007-9. I use these responses to measure the extensive
margin of firm-level innovation. About 24% of the firms (3,572 firms) in the sam-
ple can be identified as innovative by this measure. Beyond this fairly restrictive
measure of the propensity to innovate, four other binary measures are used for 1.)
product innovators, 2.) those firms that introduce a new-to-market innovation, 3.)
process innovators and 4.) those firms that their product/process innovations lead
to organizational innovation.6 The firms in the sample have also been surveyed
5Except for those estimations that make use of Two Stage Least Squares technique, I em-
ploy relative survey weights in the empirical analyses of this paper to ensure that the results are
representative.
6Table A-4 in Appendix 1 shows the cross tabulation of the frequency of innovative firms in the
sample once the alternative criteria for the probability of innovation are in use.
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about the average percentage of turnover from innovative product sales during 2007-
9, which can be used to measure the intensive margin of innovation at the firm level.
The mean of the the average percentage of turnover from innovative product sales
during 2007-9 is about 10% (with standard deviation of 19%) in the full sample,
and about 17.5% (with standard deviation of 22%) in the sub-sample of innovative
firms, as measured by disclosed innovation.
The EFIGE survey also provides detailed information that can be used to iden-
tify those MNCs that off-shore their innovative activities. In practice, trade in
innovative tasks can happen through two different channels: out-sourcing and off-
shoring. Out-sourcing is applicable when firms distribute (part of) their innovative
tasks across un-affiliated parties that might be located in their own country or in
a foreign country, whereas off-shoring refers to a case in which the second party is
located in a foreign country no matter if it is an affiliated party or not. What is
relevant in this study is the off-shoring activities.7
To find those MNCs that off-shore their innovative tasks, I first need to identify
the MNCs. I identify firm i as an MNC if it runs at least part of its production
activity in another country via FDI and/or contracts and arms length agreements.
There are 1,208 MNCs in the full sample, of which 618 firms (4% of the sample)
run at least part of their production off-shore via FDI, 487 firms (3% of the sample)
do this through contracts and arms length agreements, and 103 firms (0.6% of the
sample) use FDI as well as contracts and arms length agreements to perform their
off-shore production activities. Those MNCs are then asked a number of follow-up
questions. Among those questions, they are asked about the type of production that
is off-shored via FDI or contracts and arms length agreements. I identify MNC i
as one which partakes in trade in innovative tasks once it is actively involved in
off-shoring its R&D, engineering and design services via FDI and/or contracts and
7See Helpman (2011, pp. 126-132) for a comprehensive discussion on off-shoring versus out-
sourcing.
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arms length agreements.8 As expected, these criteria are very restrictive and, thus,
there are 166 firms (1.12% of the full sample and 13.74% of the MNCs) that fall into
this category. There are 112 firms that off-shore their innovative tasks via FDI, 43
firms that do this via contract and arms length agreements, and 11 firms that do
both of them.
Two important patterns emerge for those 166 firms that partake in trade in inno-
vative tasks. First, the majority of these firms (112+11=123 firms) have integrated
(part of) their off-shore innovative efforts via FDI. Second, the majority of these
firms (158 firms) are also involved in other types of off-shore productive activities.
For instance, 131 firms with off-shore innovative activities also off-shore the produc-
tion of their finished products, and 103 firms with off-shore innovative activities also
off-shore the production of their semi-finished products or components.
By comparison with other firms, MNCs are relatively large. Large firms (i.e.
firms with annual turnover greater than 15 million euros in 2008) make up 15% of
firms in the full sample, 41% of the MNCs, and 62% of the MNCs that off-shore their
innovative tasks. Examining the share of large firms that partake in different types
of task trades, Table 1 shows that the share of large firms is greater among those that
off-shore their innovative tasks compared to those that off-shore their non-innovative
tasks (i.e. production of finished products, semi-finished products/components or
other types of productive activities).
Compared to the full sample, Spanish firms are less involved in multinational
activities whereas German firms are relatively more involved in those types of ac-
tivities. More specifically, Spanish and German firms each represent 19% of the
firms in the stratified sample. Yet, only 9% of the MNCs are from Spain, and 25%
of the MNCs are from Germany. With two exceptions, the distribution of MNCs
with off-shore innovative activities is fairly comparable to the distribution of MNCs
8See Appendix 1 for the survey questions used to identify the MNCs, and used to identify the
MNCs that partake in trade in innovative tasks.
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across countries. Italian MNCs are less involved in trade in innovative tasks whereas
British MNCs are relatively more involved in trade in innovative tasks. More specif-
ically, Italian MNCs and British MNCs each represent about 18% of the MNCs in
the sample. Yet, only 9% of the MNCs with off-shore innovative efforts are origi-
nally from Italy, and 28% of the MNCs with off-shore innovative efforts are from the
United Kingdom. It is also important to note that more than 75% of the firms that
partake in trade in innovative tasks are from the United Kingdom (28%), Germany
(25%) and France (23%). As illustrated by the examples above, the relative im-
portance of these three countries is not merely due to the full sample stratification.
They are, in fact, more involved in multinational activities and specifically in trade
in innovative tasks.9
Firms that perform their innovative activities off-shore are relatively more suc-
cessful in terms of their innovation output. In this sub-sample, the share of firms
with disclosed innovation is relatively greater, and they enjoy greater share of inno-
vative product sales in total turnover. This superior innovation output is evident
not only in a comparison with all the firms in the sample, but also in a comparison
with the sub-sample of MNCs. As reported in Table 2, among those that partake
in trade in innovative tasks, 63% of the firms have disclosed their innovation during
2007-9. This share is relatively lower among the sub-sample of MNCs (52%), and it
is considerably lower within the full sample (24%). The mean of the share of innova-
tive product sales in total turnover among those that partake in trade in innovative
tasks is about 20% (with a standard deviation of 26%). This share is relatively lower
among the sub-sample of MNCs (15% with standard deviation of 21%), and it is
also lower within the full sample (10% with standard deviation of 19%). Those firms
that off-shore their innovative activities also employ greater number of employees
for R&D purposes. This suggests that these firms enjoy superior innovation output,
9Table A-5 in Appendix 1 depicts the distribution of firms across countries within the full
sample and sub-sample of MNCs and the MNCs that off-shore their innovative tasks.
67
and they also allocate greater share of their labor input to innovative activities.
As described above, the survey in use provides detailed information by which
I can identify the firms with off-shore innovative activities. It also provides useful
measures for the extensive and the intensive margin of innovation output. Lastly, it
provides a wide array of observables that can be used as control variables in regres-
sions predicting the innovation status of the firms or the share of innovative product
sales in total turnover.
2.3 Empirical analyses
The underlying empirical question in this study is the following: does trade in
innovative tasks by European MNCs through off-shoring R&D, design and engineer-
ing activities result in greater propensity/intensity of firm-level innovation output?
To address this question, I follow a two-stage approach. Controlling for a wide
range of covariates, I first use two instrumental variables to predict whether a firm
off-shores its innovative tasks. Given the results of the first stage and controlling for
the same vector of covariates, I then estimate the effect of off-shoring those tasks
on the probability that a firm successfully innovates (i.e. the effect on the exten-
sive margin of innovation output) and the importance of innovative product sales
in total turnover (i.e. the effect on the intensive margin of innovation output). I
first employ a Bivariate Probit model to estimate the effect on the extensive margin
of innovation, and I follow an approach proposed by Heckman (1978) to estimate
the effect on the intensive margin. The results suggest that off-shoring innovative
tasks contributes to the probability of successful innovation as well as the intensity
of innovative product sales. With the control covariates kept at their means, those
that offshore their innovative tasks are estimated to be 60% more likely to innovate,
and the share of innovative product sales in their total turnover is estimated to be
35% higher compared to those that do not. I use linear IV methods and follow
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a Control Function approach to test the robustness of the estimated effect on the
extensive margin of innovation. I also use a sub-sample from which British firms
are excluded to make sure that the results are not driven by the firms in the United
Kingdom. The key findings remain robust.
2.3.1 Trade in innovative tasks and the extensive margin of
firm-level innovation
In order to study the effect of off-shoring R&D, design and engineering activities on
the probability of firms being innovative, I employ a measure of disclosed innovation
as the primary dependent variable. This is a binary variable that indicates whether
a firm has disclosed an innovation during 2007-9 as measured by patents, industrial
design, trade mark or copy right (henceforth, DINN for disclosed innovation). I es-
timate a baseline Probit regression model first. Then, introducing two instruments,
I re-estimate the relationship under a Bivariate Probit model to address the pos-
sibility for reverse causality. To test the robustness of the results, I use linear IV
models and follow a Control Function approach. I also exclude the outward orienta-
tion controls, which may be endogenous, and perform the estimations for a smaller
vector of control covariates. Lastly, I employ a set of alternative measures for the
extensive margin to estimate the effect of trade in innovative tasks on different types
of innovations.
2.3.1.1 Baseline regression
In the baseline regression, I make use of the Maximum Likelihood Probit technique
to estimate the parameters of the following regression function and predict the
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probability of being an innovative firm, as measured by disclosed innovation:
E[DINNi|Orndi, Xi] = α0 + α1Orndi +X ′iα2 + E[uDINN |Orndi, Xi] (2.1)
The disclosed innovation measure, DINNi, is set equal to one when firm i has
disclosed an innovation via patents, industrial design, trade mark or copy right, and
zero otherwise. The measure for off-shoring R&D, Orndi, is set equal to one when
firm i off-shores its innovative tasks (i.e. R&D, design and engineering activities)
through either FDI or contracts and arms length agreements, and zero otherwise.
The key hypothesis is that α1 is positive. The vector of control covariates (Xi)
captures the intensity of R&D activities, foreign ownership status, the intensity of
exporting activities, size, age, and sector- and country-specific characteristics.
Controlling for size, age, sector- and country-specific characteristics are conven-
tional in these types of equations. To control for the variations in the intensity of
innovation inputs, I use the share of employees involved in R&D activities during
2008. This labor input variable can measure the importance of innovation for any
given firm within the sample.10 Furthermore, the share of exporting activities in
total turnover during 2008 and foreign ownership status are added to control for the
outward orientation of the firms. Being exposed to competition in foreign markets
and being owned by foreign owners may affect the innovative activities of the firm.
However, these are used only to satisfy the Conditional Independence Assumption,
and one cannot draw any causality inference from the sign and the magnitude of the
estimated correlations. To make sure that the empirical results of this paper are not
driven by the possible endogeneities of these two control covariates, the estimations
10The average share of R&D investment in total turnover during 2007-9 is an alternative control
for the intensity of innovation input. However, there are 2,142 missing observations for this variable
compared to only 17 missing observations in the share of employees involved in R&D activities
during 2008. The estimated effect of off-shoring innovative tasks on the extensive margin of
innovation remains robust when I use the alternative control. Detailed estimation results available
upon request.
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are also conducted using a smaller control vector that includes only the share of
employees involved in R&D, size, age, sector- and country-specific characteristics.
An ordinal measure is used to control for firm size. The total turnover of each
firm during 2008 is categorized as: less than 1 million euros, between 1 and 2, 2 and
10, 10 and 15, 15 and 50, 50 and 250, or more than 250 million euros. About 35% of
the firms have reported that their total turnover has either been less than 1 million
euros (12%) or between 1 and 2 million euros (22%). More than 43% of the firms
belong to the third category in which total turnover is between 2 and 10 million
euros. The rest have reported that their turnover falls in one of the other remaining
categories. An ordinal measure of age is used to control for market experience and
customer base, according to the following range: younger than 6 years, between 6
and 20 years, or older than 20 years. Close to 58% of the firms are older than 20
years, 35% of them are between 6 and 20, and about 7% are under 6 years old. I
also control for the intensity of innovation input. About 60% of the firms in the
sample have at least one labor force that is involved in R&D. Among these R&D
performers, the mean of the share of employees involved in R&D activities during
2008 is close to 13%. I add further controls for variations in exporting activities and
foreign ownership status. More than 53% of the firms have reported some exporting
activities. Among these exporters, the mean of the export share in total turnover
during 2008 is slightly more than 32%. The foreign ownership control is set equal
to one for those firms that belong to a foreign group (8.81% of the sample) and zero
otherwise. Lastly, I control for the unobserved sector- and country-specific charac-
teristics using sector- and country-dummies.
With the control covariates kept at their means, the Maximum Likelihood Probit
estimation of Equation 2.1 suggests that those firms that off-shore their innovative
tasks are 19.61% more likely to succesfully innovate as measured by disclosed in-
novation (DINN). The estimated parameters are reported in Table 3 (column I ).
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As for the control covariates, the share of employees involved in R&D, the share
of exports in total turnover, and the ordinal size measures are positively correlated
with the binary response on the left-hand side (LHS), whereas belonging to a foreign
group is negatively correlated to the variations on the LHS.11
This baseline result is likely to be biased. As discussed in the introduction, there
are two channels for reverse causality. On the one hand, those firms that have dis-
closed an innovation are more likely to have access to proper in-house innovation
inputs, and they may depend less upon off-shore innovative efforts. On the other
hand, those that have off-shored their innovative efforts are likely to be the most
innovative firms to begin with. The baseline estimate of the parameter of interest
is expected to be biased downward when the first channel dominates the second
one, and it is expected to be biased upward when the opposite is true. Either way,
the conditional expectation of the error term in Equation 2.1 (E[uDINN |Orndi, Xi])
is likely to be non-zero. To test if the variable of interest (Orndi) is in practice
endogenous, I perform a test proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986). Under the
null hypothesis, the control covariates (Xi) and the dummy variable for trade in in-
novative tasks (Orndi) are exogenous to the LHS variations. The estimated P-value
of the test is equal to zero, which enables me to reject the exogeneity of the variable
of interest (Orndi).
2.3.1.2 Bivariate Probit model
To address the potential for reverse causality, verified by the finding of the test
above, I re-estimate the effect of trade in innovative tasks on the extensive margin of
innovation under a Bivariate Probit model in which, other than the baseline model,
11 The number of observations used in this baseline regression (12,671 firms) is less than the
number of firms in the full sample (14,759 firms), due to missing data on the share of exports in
total turnover (1,964 firms), the size measure (135 firms), and the share of employees involved in
R&D (17 firms). Some firms are missing observations in only one of the control variables above,
while some are missing observations in more than one control variable.
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two instruments are employed in a separate equation to predict the probability of
a firm partaking in innovative task trade. The probability of off-shoring innovative
tasks and its effect on the probability of a firm being innovative are jointly estimated
as follows:12
DINNi = γ10 + γ11Orndi +X
′
iγ12 + ui (2.2)
Orndi = γ20 + IV
′
i γ21 +X
′
iγ22 + ei (2.3)
(u, e) ∼ N(0,Σ)
I employ two instruments for the IV vector in Equation 2.3: 1.) a dummy for fam-
ily management, and 2.) a dummy for derivative usage. Based on survey responses
to questions on family ownership and management practice, Altomonte, Aquilante,
and Ottaviano (2012) define a family management dummy variable (henceforth,
Fam) that is set equal to one for those firms in which the share of managers related
to the controlling family is higher than the national average. Based on this mea-
sure, approximately 25% of the firms in the sample are managed by their controlling
family. This instrument is likely to be correlated with the variations of trade in in-
novative tasks, and it is orthogonal to the error terms in the baseline models.
There are also a number of questions in this survey that deal with general fi-
nancial issues at the firm. Among these, firms have been asked whether they have
used any derivative products for external financing needs, treasury management, or
foreign exchange risk protection. I use the responses to this question as my second
instrument. Among other purposes, financial derivatives are widely used to manage
exchange rate risks. Thus, a derivative usage dummy variable (henceforth, Dev)
may predict the probability of trade in innovative tasks done by MNCs. However,
this instrument may not be perfectly exogenous to the innovative activities. Those
MNCs that partake in trade in innovative tasks are not the only firms that actively
12Greene (2012, pp. 738-752) provides a detailed discussion of such an approach.
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hedge against exchange rate risks. Among others, exporters are also likely to hedge
against these risks and, empirically, there is a correlation between exporting and
innovative activities.13 Controlling for the export share in total turnover should
minimize this issue and improve the usefulness of the derivative usage dummy as
an appropriate instrument. I perform the key IV estimations employing both of the
instruments in an IV vector, as well as using each of the instruments separately.
The Bivariate Probit model estimations, reported in Table 3 (columns II-1 and
II-2 ), show that those firms that off-shore their innovative activities are more likely
to successfully innovate as measured by disclosed innovation. These results suggest
that, keeping the control covariates at their means, those firms that off-shore their
R&D, design and engineering activities are 61.53% more likely to innovate. The
instruments in use are highly effective. There is an inverse and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the binary variations in family management and trade in
innovative tasks, suggesting that family managed firms are less likely to off-shore
their innovative tasks. There is also a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship between the binary variations in derivative usage and trade in innovative tasks,
suggesting that those firms that use financial derivatives are more likely to off-shore
their innovative tasks. The overall F-statistic of the Bivariate Probit estimation
reaches 79.88 when both of the instruments are used, illustrating the goodness of
fit.
Incorporating the exogenous variations of the instruments into the model, the
estimated effect of trade in innovative tasks on the extensive margin of innovation
is greater than what the baseline model suggests. The marginal effect of trade in
innovative tasks on the extensive margin of innovation is estimated to be equal to
19.61% in the baseline regression. The Bivariate Probit model suggests that this
13For instance, Dachs and Ebersberger (2009) show that, among other covariates, exporting
activities are strongly correlated with innovative activities of firms in Austria.
74
marginal effect is estimated to be equal to 61.53%.14 The difference between the
baseline results and Bivariate Probit results implies that the first channel of reverse
causality dominates the second channel.
As expected, there is a positive correlation between the innovation input control
(the share of employees involved in R&D) and the binary innovation output on the
LHS. As for outward orientation controls, foreign ownership is negatively correlated
with innovation status, and the intensity of exporting activities is positively corre-
lated with innovation status. The negative correlation between foreign ownership
status and innovation output may imply that foreign-owned firms in this sample
are mainly acquired for non-innovative tasks (e.g. routine production, distribution,
and local marketing).15 A positive correlation between the intensity of exporting
activities and innovation output has been reported in previous literature.16 Also,
the magnitude of the positive correlation between firm size and innovation status
increases as firms grow in size. However, compared to newly established businesses,
age does not appear to be correlated with innovation status.17
The above results remain the same when I use the instrumental variables sep-
arately in two Bivariate Probit model estimations. The sign and statistical signifi-
cance of the estimated parameters associated with the instruments remain the same,
and the estimated marginal effect is close to what is reported above.18
14Predicting the probability of a firm being innovative (i.e. Pr(DINNi = 1)) under Probit
assumptions, this marginal effect is computed when all the control covariates are kept at their
means.
15These types of results, which indicate asset-exploiting behavior of the foreign MNCs, have
been documented in previous empirical studies. See Dachs and Ebersberger (2009) for a review of
competing empirical findings on the impacts of foreign ownership on innovation output.
16Lileeva and Trefler (2010) is a recent example.
17In the interest of space, the estimated coefficients of the ordinal size and age measures are not
reported in Table 3. More detailed estimation results available upon request.
18Detailed estimation results available upon request.
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2.3.1.3 Robustness
In order to test the robustness of the findings for the extensive margin, I first em-
ploy a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method under a Linear Probability model
and make use of the exogenous variations of the instruments. Then, I turn to the
Control Function approach to re-estimate the relationship controlling for predicted
residuals. Lastly, I use a smaller vector of controls where outward orientation mea-
sures, which may be endogenous to the LHS variations, are excluded. The results
are robust regardless of the estimation method and the vector of controls.
In terms of sign and statistical significance of the estimated parameter of inter-
est, the result of the linear IV estimation, reported in Table 3 (column III ), is in
line with the findings of the Bivariate Probit estimations. Those that off-shore their
innovative tasks are more likely to successfully innovate and have their innovation
disclosed. Since the underlying probability model is linear, however, the magnitude
of the effect is overstated. Also, the F-statistic of the first stage is fairly low. These
typical shortcomings notwithstanding, I am able to examine the exogeneity of the
instruments under the linear IV estimation. To test the orthogonality condition,
I make use of a Sargan (1958) over-identification test. The null hypothesis of this
test implies that the instruments in use are exogenous to the LHS variations. When
I employ both of the instruments, the underlying orthogonality hypothesis of the
over-identification test is clearly not rejected (P-value=0.76).
Following the Control Function approach, I address the reverse causality prob-
lem by controlling for generalized residuals of a Probit model where the endogenous
treatment is used on the LHS. The result of the Control Function approach estima-
tion is not going to suffer from potential shortcomings of Local Average Treatment
Effect.
In the first step (Equation 2.4 below), the probability of being an MNC that
off-shores its innovative tasks is estimated under a Probit model assumption using
76
vector Z which is made up of the control covariates (R&D input intensity, exporting
activities, foreign ownership status, size, age, sector- and country-specific character-
istics) and the instruments (family managed and derivative usage dummies):
E[Orndi|Xi] = Z ′iη (2.4)
By estimating the non-zero conditional expectation of the error terms in the
baseline model (E[uDINN |Orndi, Xi]) via the estimation done in the first step, one
can obtain the generalized residuals (ĝri) to control for the endogeneity:
ĝri = (Orndi)(φ(Z
′
iη̂)/Φ(Z
′
iη̂))− (1−Orndi)(φ(−Z ′iη̂)/Φ(−Z ′iη̂)) (2.5)
Predicting the generalized residuals in Equation 2.5, I then estimate the prob-
ability of being a firm that successfully innovates (Equation 2.6 below) using the
same control covariates, the generalized residuals and the treatment, which is no
longer endogenous.19
E[DINNi|Orndi, Xi, ĝri] = ζ0 + ζ1Orndi +X ′iζ2 + ζ3ĝri (2.6)
The result reported in Table 3 (column IV ) suggests that the estimated coef-
ficient of interest is relatively greater when using the Control Function approach.
Thus, the estimated marginal impact of off-shoring innovative tasks on the proba-
bility of being an innovative firm that discloses its innovation is also greater (those
firms that partake in trade in innovative tasks are 77.90% more likely to be inno-
vative as measured by disclosed innovation). The sign and statistical significance
of the estimated parameter of interest are in line with the Bivariate Probit model
estimation, which is also true for the estimated coefficients of control covariates.20
19Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) provide a detailed discussion of such an approach.
20Sector 9 is dropped due to the fact that none of the firms that come from this sector off-shore
their innovative tasks (thus reducing the number of observations in the Control Function approach
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Since the outward orientation measures that are used as controls may be endoge-
nous, I drop the binary measure for foreign ownership as well as the share of exports
in total turnover to make sure that the results are not sensitive. A greater number
of observations can be used once the control for exporting activities is excluded from
the vector of control covariates, bringing the total observations to 14,607 firms. The
estimation results remain robust when these controls are excluded.21
2.3.1.4 Alternative measures for innovation status
The LHS variable in the analyses above (DINN ) is not the only measure of inno-
vation available in this survey. The survey contains the type of innovations carried
out by any given innovative firm. Thus, I substitute a measure for (new-to-market)
product innovation as well as process and organizational innovation for DINN on
the LHS and repeat the same estimation procedure for each one separately. These
are all binary measures that are equal to one once a firm reports (new-to-market)
product innovation, process innovation, or organizational innovation, respectively.
By contrast to the results where DINN is used on the LHS, the evidence of
the impacts of off-shoring innovative tasks on specific types of innovation output is
inconclusive. Table 4 shows that although the baseline results indicate that trade
in innovative tasks is positively correlated with the four different types of innova-
tion output, the Two Stage Least Squares estimations suggest that trade in these
tasks increases the probability of a firm being innovative only when the extensive
margin is measured via product innovation. Due to its linear set-up, the magnitude
of the estimated parameter is larger than expected, and the F-statistic of the first
stage is fairly low. Also, the Two Stage Least Squares results cannot be confirmed
by the Bivariate Probit model and Control Function approach estimations, where
estimation to 12,652 firms instead of 12,671).
21Detailed estimation results available upon request.
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the estimated parameter of interest is insignificant.22 Nevertheless, since the over-
identification test performed after this estimation indicates that the orthogonality
between the instruments and the error terms cannot be rejected (P-value=0.40), the
estimated positive correlation may still be informative.
The linear IV results, reported in Table 4, suggest that the impact of trade in in-
novative tasks on innovation output is stronger when it comes to product innovation
versus process innovation. Nieto and Rodriguez (2011) report similar findings for a
panel of 12,000 Spanish firms. They examine the effect of a lagged R&D off-shoring
treatment on the current innovation output. Their response variable is measured
by product and process innovation. Employing Probit and Bivariate Probit esti-
mations, they find that trade in innovative tasks has greater impact on product
innovation compared to process innovation.
Summarizing the above results, the positive effect of trade in innovative tasks
on the extensive margin of innovation can be confirmed by various estimation tech-
niques when this margin is measured by disclosed innovation. The same is also
evident when the extensive margin is measured by product innovation. Beyond
these two measures, however, I find no conclusive evidence of a positive or adverse
impact on the extensive margin of innovation from off-shoring innovative activities,
when it comes to new-to-market product innovation, process innovation, or organi-
zational innovation.
22Detailed estimation results available upon request.
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2.3.2 Trade in innovative tasks and the intensive margin of
firm-level innovation
In this section, I examine how trade in innovative tasks contributes to the intensity of
innovation output. The response variable is the average share of innovative product
sales in total turnover during 2007-9 (henceforth, IPS for innovative product sales),
which measures the intensive margin of firm-level innovation output.23 These types
of measures have been frequently used after Cre`pon, Duguet, and Mairessec (1998)
found that, other than patents, innovative product sales measures are positively cor-
related with firms’ productivity. Roberts (1999) also suggests that these measures
are positively correlated with firms’ profitability. Using a baseline regression model,
I first estimate the effect of off-shoring innovative tasks on the intensity of innovation
output. After I report the results of linear IV regressions, I re-estimate the relation-
ship following an approach proposed by Heckman (1978) to address the possibility
for reverse causality. To ensure that the underlying orthogonality condition behind
the identification strategy is satisfied, I follow an indirect over-identification test.
Lastly, I perform the same estimations using a smaller vector of control covariates,
from which the outward orientation controls are excluded.
2.3.2.1 Baseline regression
In the baseline regression, I make use of Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the pa-
rameters of the following regression function and predict the intensity of innovation
output, as measured by the share of innovative product sales in total turnover:
E[IPSi|Orndi, Xi] = β0 + β1Orndi +X ′iβ2 + E[uIPS|Orndi, Xi] (2.7)
23The EFIGE survey provides me with a measure of the share of innovative product sales in
total turnover. Others have used innovative product sales per employee to measure the importance
of innovation output at any given firm (e.g. OECD 2009). Unfortunately, I neither observe this in
the survey, nor can I compute it.
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The LHS variable (IPSi) measures the average share of innovative product sales
in total turnover of firm i during 2007-9. I make use of the same treatment (Orndi),
which is equal to one when firm i off-shores its innovative tasks through either FDI
or contracts and arms length agreements, and zero otherwise. I also employ the
same vector of control covariates (Xi), which includes measures of the intensity of
R&D activities, foreign ownership status, the intensity of exporting activities, size,
age, sector- and country-specific characteristics. The nature of the LHS variations is,
therefore, the only difference between the baseline models in Equation 2.1 and 2.7.
The response variable is binary and measures the extensive margin of innovation in
Equation 2.1, whereas it is continuous and measures the intensive margin of inno-
vation in Equation 2.7.
Conditional upon the controls in use, off-shoring innovative tasks is estimated to
increase the share of innovative product sales in total turnover by 6.01% as reported
in Table 5 (column I ). As expected, the share of labor input involved in R&D and
the share of exports in total turnover are both positively correlated with the share
of innovative product sales in total turnover. Also, in general the greater the size
of the firm, the greater the correlation between size and the share of innovative
product sales. These correlations are in line with the previous findings where the
response variable is a measure of innovation status rather than innovation intensity.
However, the estimated coefficients for age measures are now significant and neg-
ative. Compared to the youngest firms, the magnitude of the negative correlation
between age and innovation intensity increases as age increases, which suggests that
the share of innovative product sales in total turnover is greater among the youngest
firms.24 Also, the negative correlation between foreign ownership status and inno-
vation output is no longer significant.
Considering similar reverse causality channels to that for DINN, those firms for
24In the interest of space, the estimated coefficients of the ordinal size and age measures are not
reported in Table 5. More detailed estimation results available upon request.
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which innovative product sales is of relative importance are more likely to have ac-
cess to in-house innovation input and depend less upon external innovative efforts
such as off-shore innovation. Also, those firms that partake in off-shoring innovative
efforts are likely to be the most productive and innovative firms and thus enjoy a
larger share of innovative product sales in total turnover. The estimated effect of
off-shoring innovative tasks on the intensive margin of innovation is biased down-
ward when the first channel dominates the second one, and it is biased upward when
the opposite is true. Regardless of the expected direction of bias, the conditional
expectation of the error term in Equation 2.7 (E[uIPS|Orndi, Xi]) is likely to be
non-zero. I perform an augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and MacK-
innon 1993) to verify the possibility of reverse causality. For the purpose of this test,
a Linear Probability model is first employed in which the probability of off-shoring
innovative tasks is predicted using the control covariates and the instruments. Then,
the predicted residuals of this first stage are added to the baseline regression. It
turns out that the predicted residuals are of explanatory power (P-value=0.07), in-
dicating that the baseline regression suffers from endogeneity.
2.3.2.2 Heckman (1978) approach
To address the possibility of reverse causality, verified by the finding of the test
above, I re-estimate the baseline regression under Two Stage Least Squares where
both of the instruments are employed. The results are reported in Table 5 (column
II ). This estimation yields a fairly high standard deviation for the parameter of
interest. Thus, the estimated impact is not statistically significant. Consequently, I
am not able to directly test the orthogonality of the instruments in this section. The
linear first stage of this estimation seems to be the underlying problem behind the
insignificant result. To avoid this, I make use of the non-linear fits of the endogenous
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treatment (Ôrnd) as new instruments for another 2SLS estimation, which yields a
more efficient estimate for the parameter of interest (Angrist and Pischke 2009, pp.
188-192).
Following Heckman (1978), the instruments in use (Fam and Dev) are employed
in a Pre-2SLS step where the model below is estimated via a Maximum Likelihood
Probit technique:
E[Orndi|IVi, Xi] = δ0 + δ1IVi +X ′iδ2 (2.8)
The predicted LHS value of the estimation conducted for Equation 2.8 (Ôrnd)
is then used in the second step as a new IV to estimate Equation 2.9 via a 2SLS
method:
E[IPSi|Orndi, Xi] = α0 + α1Orndi +X ′iα2 + E[uIPS|Orndi, Xi] (2.9)
In Equation 2.8, the response variable (Orndi) is the endogenous treatment used
in Equation 2.9. It is a binary measure equal to one for those MNCs that off-shore
their innovative tasks via FDI or contracts and arms length agreements, and zero
otherwise. The response variable in Equation 2.9 (IPSi) is the average share of
innovative product sales in total turnover during 2007-9. The vector of control co-
variates (Xi) is the same as the one used in the baseline regression (Equation 2.7)
and controls for the variations in the share of labor input involved in R&D activities,
foreign ownership status, share of exports in total turnover, size, age, sector- and
country-specific characteristics.
The Pre-2SLS results, reported in Table 5 (column III-1 ), suggest that family
managed firms are less likely to off-shore their innovative tasks, whereas those firms
that use financial derivatives are more likely to do so. The resulting estimations
from the 2SLS step, reported in Table 5 (column III-2 ), indicate that those MNCs
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that carry out their R&D, design and engineering activities in another country via
FDI or contracts and arms length agreements gain 35.50% greater share of innova-
tive product sales in total turnover. These results suggest that the magnitude of
correlation between trade in innovative tasks and innovation intensity among firms
in the sample is largly underestimated in the estimation of the baseline regression
(at 6.01%).
As for the controls, the share of employees involved in R&D (2008) is positively
correlated with the share of innovative product sales in total turnover (2007-9).
There is also some evidence of a positive correlation between exporting activities
and the intensive margin of innovation output as well as a negative correlation be-
tween foreign ownership status and the intensive margin of innovation output. Yet,
the former is not significant when both of the instruments are used. Lastly, as
suggested by the negative correlations between the age measures and the response
variable, younger firms appear to enjoy a greater share of innovative product sales
in total turnover.25
It is important to test for the orthogonality of the instruments in use. Unfor-
tunately, there is no direct way to test for the exclusion restriction following the
Heckman (1978) method. The Pre-2SLS step and the first stage of the 2SLS step
seem to provide a proper fit. The estimated coefficients for the instruments are
significant and of expected sign. The F-statistic associated with the first stage of
the 2SLS estimation is also high enough once the predicted LHS variable in the Pre-
2SLS step (Ôrnd) is used as the IV for the estimation in the 2SLS step. When both
of the instruments are used in the Pre-2SLS step, for instance, the F-statistic asso-
ciated with the first stage of the 2SLS estimation reaches 104.99. Although these
fits are necessary, the exogeneity of the instruments must be tested too. Thus, an
indirect over-identification test is conducted. First, I assume that Fam is an exoge-
25In the interest of space, the estimated coefficients of the ordinal size and age measures are not
reported in Table 5. More detailed estimation results available upon request.
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nous instrument. Since the unconditional correlation between Fam and IPS is close
to zero, this seems to be a fairly reasonable assumption.26 Also, let ÔrndDev,i be the
predicted values of Orndi estimated via the control covariates and Dev on the RHS.
Employing Fam along with ÔrndDev,i in an IV vector used in a 2SLS estimation
of Equation 2.9, I conduct an over-identification test and take its result as indirect
evidence of the required orthogonality. Interestingly enough, the null hypothesis
of the over-identification test cannot be rejected in this case (P-value=0.41), which
suggests that these two instruments remain orthogonal to the error terms in the
original model. Panels III and IV in Table 5 provide a comparison between the
result of the estimation in which ÔrndFam,Dev,i is used as an instrument and the
estimation in which Fam and ÔrndDev,i are used as instruments. These two estima-
tions yield similar coefficients for the treatment of interest.27
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model above using a smaller control vec-
tor because of the possible endogeneity of outward orientation controls (i.e. foreign
ownership and exporting activities). Once a smaller control vector is employed, the
baseline results remain intact. The Heckman method estimation of the parameter
of interest turns out to be of expected sign, but at relatively low significance level
(P-value<0.15).28
In summary, for the intensive margin, I address the potential reverse causality
in the baseline estimation of Equation 2.7 by employing the non-linear fits of the
endogenous treatment of interest in the Pre-2SLS step as instruments in a 2SLS
estimation following an approach proposed by Heckman (1978). Controlling for a
26The unconditional correlation between Fam and IPS is equal to -0.0091 in the full sample
(14,759 firms). This unconditional correlation is equal to -0.0059 in the sub-sample in which all
the control covariates are observed (12,652 firms).
27I also perform the test differently, and employ another non-linear prediction of the treatment
(ÔrndFam,i), which is predicted via the family management dummy and usual controls, along with
the derivative usage dummy in a vector of instruments for the 2SLS step. The estimated parameter
of interest in the 2SLS step is comparable to that reported in Table 5. Also, I cannot reject the
orthogonality of the instruments used in the 2SLS step once I perform an over-identification test
(P-value=0.38). Detailed estimation results available upon request.
28Detailed estimation results available upon request.
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wide range of covariates, the results of the estimations above suggest that trade
in innovative tasks positively affects the intensive margin of firm-level innovation,
and the magnitude of this effect is greater than what the baseline correlation would
imply.
2.3.3 Further robustness analyses
In the regression analyses above, I employ sector- and country-specific intercepts
to control for unobserved characteristics across different sectors and countries. In
order to make sure that neither a specific sector nor a specific country drives the
key results, I re-estimate the baseline effect of trade in innovative tasks on innova-
tion output for each sector (controlling for the usual covariates as well as country-
specific intercepts), each country (controlling for the usual covariates as well as
sector-specific intercepts) and sector-country pairs (controlling for the usual covari-
ates).29 The results suggest that no specific sector or sector-country pair is of vital
importance, although some sectors (notably, sector number 4, 5, 11, 1 and 10) ap-
pear to be more important than others.30 The firms from the United Kingdom,
however, form an important sub-sample when I re-estimate the baseline regression
for each country separately.31 Excluding British firms (2,067 observations) from
the full sample, I re-estimate the baseline regressions as well as the IV regressions
across the remaining countries. Table 6 shows that the key findings of the empirical
analyses are robust to this exclusion.
29I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. Detailed estimation result for the
sectors, countries, and sector-country pairs available upon request.
30I am unable to identify these sectors explicitly as I only have access to a randomized industry
identifier in the EFIGE survey.
31As discussed in Section 2, More than 75% of the MNCs with off-shore innovative efforts are
originally from the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Among these, British MNCs are the
most important group. In fact, 28% of the MNCs with off-shore innovative efforts are from the
United Kingdom (see Table A-5 in Appendix 1).
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As for the propensity to innovate, the Bivariate Probit model estimation (Table
6, columns II-1 and II-2 ) suggests that those firms that off-shore their innovative
activities are 66% (compared to 61% in Table 3, columns II-1 and II-2 ) more likely
to succesfully innovate as measured by disclosed innovation. The estimated coeffi-
cients for the instruments are significant and of expected signs, and the F-statistic
of the Bivariate Probit model estimation reaches 53.77. The robustness of this pos-
itive effect is verified by a linear IV estimation (Table 6, column III ) and a control
function estimation (Table 6, column IV ).32 These results suggest that the baseline
estimation of the parameter of interest (Table 6, column I ) is biased downward.
As for the intensity of innovation output, the IV estimation using Heckman
(1978) method (Table 6, columns VI-1 and VI-2 ) suggest that those firms that off-
shore their innovative tasks enjoy 29% (compared to 35% in Table 5, columns III-1
and III-2 ) greater share of innovative product sales in total turnover when both
instruments are used in the IV vector. This implies that the baseline regression
(Table 6, column V ) is biased downward. As expected, the linear IV estimation
yields a large standard error for the estimated coefficient of interest, and it is not
possible for me to directly test for the orthogonality of the instruments. To test for
the orthogonality condition indirectly, I run two separate over-identification tests.
I first use the derivative usage dummy along with the usual controls to predict the
treatment of interest (ÔrndDev,i) in the Pre-2SLS step. Then, for the 2SLS step, I
employ the non-linear prediction of the treatment (ÔrndDev,i) along with the family
management dummy in a vector of instruments. The estimated parameter of interest
is in line with the estimation where both of the instruments are directly used in the
Pre-2SLS step. However, the P-value of the over-identification test is such that the
orthogonality hypothesis can be rejected (P-value=0.07). I repeat the same exercise
and employ another non-linear prediction of the treatment (ÔrndFam,i), which is
32Using the linear IV estimation results, I perform a Sargan (1958) over-identification test to
ensure that the instruments remain exogenous when British firms are excluded from the sample.
The result suggests that the null hypothesis of orthogonality cannot be rejected (P-value=0.87).
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predicted via the family management dummy and the usual controls, along with the
derivative usage dummy in an IV vector for the 2SLS step. The estimated param-
eter of interest is again in line with the estimation where both of the instruments
are directly used in the Pre-2SLS step. This time, however, the resulting P-value
of the overidentification test is such that the orthogonality hypothesis cannot be
rejected (P-value=0.54). Thus, the indirect tests of orthogonality do not provide
conclusive results. Nevertheless, in terms of the parameter of interest and the esti-
mated coefficients of the control covariates, the IV estimation using Heckman (1978)
method yields comparable estimates when I use the full sample and when I use the
sub-sample from which British firms are excluded.
2.4 Discussion
The empirical analyses of this paper indicate that trade in innovative tasks con-
tributes to the extensive and the intensive margins of innovation output. Multiple
tests verify the robustness of the above findings to different regression function spec-
ifications, estimation techniques, and samples. Nevertheless, there are three primary
caveats when interpreting the key findings.33 Suppose firm i is identified as a firm
that partakes in trade in innovative tasks based on the criteria introduced in Section
2. Controlling for a number of covariates, the key findings of this paper suggest that
it is more likely that firm i has disclosed an innovation, and it is also expected that
it has enjoyed a greater share of innovative product sales in total turnover. The first
caveat is that I am not able to observe whether the disclosed innovation by firm i
results directly from its off-shore innovative efforts. I am also not able to observe
the share of the revenue generated by those innovative products that are specifically
developed off-shore by firm i. Second, even when no innovative activity is conducted
33I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising these points.
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abroad, firm i may still report some off-shore innovative activities in order to min-
imize its tax burden. When this transfer pricing is successful, it may contribute to
firm i ’s profit, which in turn provides the firm with more financial resources to in-
novate at home. Since I am unable to observe the exact destination at which those
R&D, design and engineering activities are conducted, I can neither confirm nor
reject this transfer pricing hypothesis. Third, it is likely that the extensive and the
intensive margins of innovation output are measured with some errors. For instance,
the disclosed innovation measure may not be an ideal indicator of innovation output
due to strategic patenting behavior.34 Therefore, the estimated parameters of inter-
est may overstate the real effect. To make up for these shortcomings, more detailed
surveys are required. In particular, more information about the direct links between
trade in innovative tasks and innovation output are needed as well as information
about the countries that host such off-shoring activities. Also, more details about
firms’ innovation output can improve the precision of the estimations conducted in
future research.
This paper also calls for further research in three related areas. First, it is impor-
tant to examine the causality relation under a (quasi-)experimental set-up. Despite
the fact that the IV analyses in this paper address the potential for reverse causality,
my estimations do not capture the magnitude of the effect under a well-designed
randomized trial.
Second, it is important to examine the push and pull factors that influence
firms’ selection into this specific type of task trade under a general equilibrium set-
up. Some important patterns emerge from the data, which may help explain this
selection. As described in Section 2, the share of large firms (i.e. firms with an-
nual turnover greater than 15 million euros in 2008) is greater among those firms
that off-shore their innovative tasks. This is evident not only when I compare them
34See Nagaoka, Motohashi and Goto (2010, pp. 1105-1117) for a recent survey on the use and
the shortcomings of patent data in measuring innovation output.
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to the rest of the sample, but also when I compare them with those MNCs that
off-shore other types of productive activities. This implies that trade in innovative
tasks may be profitable at higher levels of productivity compared to the productivity
cut-off required for trade in non-innovative tasks. The majority of the firms with
off-shore innovative activities are also involved in other types of off-shore productive
activities, which is another indicator of their superior productivity. Furthermore,
the comparisons provided in Section 2 suggest that most of the firms that off-shore
their innovative activities tend to integrate their off-shore innovative efforts via FDI.
By off-shoring their innovative tasks to affiliated parties, firms are more likely to
control the intellectual property risk associated with their off-shore R&D.35 This
internalization decision suggests that these firms, which are likely to be very pro-
ductive, are able to finance the (fixed) cost associated with integration, and in return
they may protect their innovative efforts abroad.36
Third, it is important to examine the geographic agglomeration of innovative
activities on a global scale in order to explore the underlying forces that motivate
trade in innovative tasks. Employing a geographically weighted technology spillover
measure, Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) suggest that geographic
proximity to where successful innovation happens (as measured by the location of
patents) may contribute to the firms’ productivity and market value. Lychagin et
al. (2010) provide more detailed evidence supporting the hypothesis that geographic
proximity matters for productivity, and they suggest that geographic spillover ef-
fects are larger when one considers the location of innovative activities rather than
the location of headquarter activities. Hence, the most productive firms are likely to
off-shore their innovative activities to exploit the global geographic agglomeration
35Nieto and Rodriguez (2011) suggest that this type of integration, which in the management
literature is known as captive off-shoring, has greater impacts on innovation output.
36This sorting pattern is close to the predictions in Antra`s and Helpman (2004). When manu-
facturing costs are relatively lower in the foreign country, they predict that the most productive
firms integrate their productive activities abroad via FDI. However, the assumption of that model
does not necessarily accommodate the difference between the innovative and non-innovative tasks
that are performed off-shore.
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of innovative activities.
2.5 Conclusion
This study examines the firm-level gains, measured in terms of innovation out-
put, from off-shoring innovative tasks via foreign direct investment or contracts and
arms length agreements. The detailed EFIGE survey in use enables me to address
the reverse causality problem and estimate the magnitude of the gains in terms of
the extensive margin of innovation (i.e. whether a firm innovates) and the intensive
margin of innovation (i.e. how much a firm innovates).
Using the exogenous variations of the instrumental variables and conditional
upon a wide range of observables, the key findings of this paper suggest that those
firms that off-shore their innovative tasks are more likely to successfully innovate,
and they also enjoy a greater share of innovative product sales in total turnover.
More specifically, the Bivariate Probit estimations suggest that those MNCs that
off-shore their innovative activities are 60% more likely to innovate, as measured by
disclosed innovation. This finding is robust once I make use of linear IV methods
and follow the Control Function approach. Analyzing different types of innovation,
I show that product innovation is positively affected by off-shore innovation. Yet,
there is no conclusive evidence of any effects on innovative activities in terms of
process or organizational innovation. Furthermore, the Heckman (1978) method
estimations suggest that those MNCs that off-shore their innovative activities have
approximately 35% greater share of innovative product sales in total turnover.
The key findings of this paper underline the potential gains from multinational
task distribution in R&D, design and engineering activities. Those European MNCs
that partake in these types of intra-firm trades are more likely to be innovative (as
measured by disclosed innovation), and their innovations positively contribute to
their total sales. This is of interest not only for those MNCs, but it is also of inter-
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est for the countries that (intend to) host innovative activities. Beyond that, and
perhaps more importantly, the evidence in support of the existence and the magni-
tude of these gains on both margins are important for policy makers in developed
countries where MNCs play a crucial role in the overall investment in innovation.
Distortionary measures against these task distributions may adversely affect the in-
novative performance of MNCs and may also have an indirect impact on innovation
in aggregate.
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2.6    Tables and Appendix 
Table 1: Distribution of MNCs across size categories by their type of task trade 
 Number of firms who partake in trade in 
Annual turnover in 
2008 
(in million euros) 
non-innovative tasks innovative tasks 
 Number Share a Number Share a 
< 1 34 3% 3 2% 
1-2 88 8% 10 6% 
2-10 410 36% 44 27% 
10-15 115 10% 6 4% 
15-50 232 20% 38 23% 
50-250 184 16% 39 24% 
> 250 76 7% 24 15% 
Large b  43%  62% 
Total 1,139  164c  
Notes: 
a) Shares are computed for any given size category relative to the total 
number of firms who take part in the similar task trade. 
b) Firms with annual turnover greater than 15 million euro are 
identified as Large.  
c) Turnover information is not available for 2 firms with off-shore 
innovative activities. 
 
Table 2: Comparison between the firms in the full sample, the MNCs, and those who offshore their 
innovative tasks 
 Full Sample MNCs a 
Those MNCs who 
offshore their 
innovative tasks b 
Number of firms 14,759 1,208 166 
1.) Percentage of firms with 
disclosed innovation (2007-9) 
24% 52% 63% 
2.) Mean of the share of Innovative 
Product Sales in turnover (2007-9) 
10% 15% 20% 
3.) Mean of the share of employees 
involved in R&D (2008) 
8% 10% 14% 
4.) Percentage of firms who belong 
to a foreign firm 
9% 22% 38% 
5.) Mean of the share of exports in 
total turnover (2008) 
20% 35% 40% 
6.) Percentage of family-managed 
firms 
25% 10% 4% 
7.) Percentage of firms who use 
financial derivatives 
4% 11% 13% 
Notes: 
a) Firms who have reported some FDI or foreign contracts and arms length agreements are identified 
as multinational (MNC). 
b) Firms who have reported some FDI or foreign contracts and arms length agreements for R&D, 
engineering and design services are identified as those who have off-shored their innovative tasks.    
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Table 3: The effect of trade in innovative tasks on innovation measured by the extensive margin of innovation a 
 Baseline 
Bivariate 
Probit 
2SLS b 
Control 
Function b 
 Probit LHS:DINN LHS:Ornd LPM  
 I II-1 II-2 III IV 
Dummy for off-shoring innovative tasks (2008) 0.578*** 1.739***  8.626* 2.815*** 
 (0.125) (0.285)  (4.917) (0.685) 
Share of employees involved in R&D (2008) 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Belonging to a foreign group -0.198*** -0.212*** 0.215* -0.181** -0.233*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.114) (0.087) (0.054) 
Share of exports in total turnover (2008) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Generalized residuals     -0.958*** 
     (0.283) 
IV: Family Managed   -0.340**   
   (0.148)   
IV: Derivative Usage   0.456***   
   (0.145)   
Number of observations 12,671 12,671 12,671 12,652 
F-Statistics F(28, 12643) F(57, 12614)  
F(28, 
12624) 
 43.77 79.88  43.79 
First stage summary statistics   F(2,12641)  
   2.16002  
P-value of the over-identification test   0.76  
Estimated marginal effect of trade in innovative tasks  on 
the probability of a firm being innovative as measured by 
disclosed innovation (DINN) c 
0.1961 0.6153   0.7790 
(0.048) (0.076)   (0.041) 
Notes:   
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis; An intercept, ordinal size measures, ordinal age measures, sector-dummies and 
country-dummies are included in the estimations above. 
a) The extensive margin of innovation is measured by disclosed innovation (DINN) in the estimations above.  
b) Both instruments (Fam and Dev) are used in the Control Function and the 2SLS estimations. 
c) Predicting Probability (DINNi=1) under Probit assumptions, the marginal effects of trade in innovative tasks are computed when 
all the control variables are kept at their means. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: The effect of trade in innovative tasks on innovation using alternative measures for the extensive margin of innovation a   
  Baseline (Probit) 
  
Product 
Innovation 
New-to-market 
Product 
Innovation 
Process 
Innovation 
Organizational 
Innovation 
Dummy for off-shoring innovative tasks (2008) 0.336** 0.340** 0.262** 0.333*** 
(0.146) (0.133) (0.124) (0.124) 
Share of employees involved in R&D (2008) 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Belonging to a foreign group -0.130*** -0.099* -0.067 -0.124** 
(0.05) (0.051) (0.047) (0.05) 
Share of exports in total turnover (2008) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.001** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of observations 12,671 12,671 12,671 12,671 
F-statistics F(28, 12643) F(28, 12643) F(28, 12643) F(28, 12643) 
40.8 40.08 21.7 19.51 
  2SLS b (LPM) 
  
Product 
Innovation 
New-to-market 
Product 
Innovation 
Process 
Innovation 
Organizational 
Innovation 
Dummy for off-shoring innovative tasks (2008) 7.169* 1.41 1.079 2.444 
(4.262) (1.767) (1.748) -2.082 
Share of employees involved in R&D (2008) 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) -0.001 
Belonging to a foreign group -0.139* 0.050* -0.03 -0.073** 
(0.075) (0.03) (0.03) -0.036 
Share of exports in total turnover (2008) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 12,671 12,671 12,671 12,671 
First stage summary statistics F(2,12641)    
2.16002    
P-value of the over-identification test 0.4       
Notes:  
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis; An intercept, ordinal size measures, ordinal age measures, sector-dummies and 
country-dummies are included in the estimations above. 
a) The extensive margin of innovation is measured via four alternative criteria: Product Innovation, New-to-market Product Innovation, 
Process Innovation and Organizational Innovation. 
b) Both instruments (Fam and Dev) are used in the 2SLS estimations above. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: The effect of trade in innovative tasks on innovation measured by the intensive margin of innovation a 
 Baseline IV IV Estimation Using Heckman (1978) Method 
 OLS 2SLS Pre-2SLS 2SLS Pre-2SLS 2SLS 
 LHS:IPS LHS:IPS LHS:Ornd LHS:IPS LHS:Ornd LHS:IPS 
 
IV:[Fam  
Dev] 
 IV:Ornd̂Fam,Dev  IV:[Fam,Ornd̂Dev] 
 I II III-1 III-2 IV-1 IV-2 
Dummy for off-shoring 
innovative tasks (2008) 
6.010** 73.961  35.503**  32.709* 
(2.605) (64.703)  (17.547)  (18.128) 
Share of employees involved 
in R&D (2008) 
0.257*** 0.255*** 0.009*** 0.266*** 0.009*** 0.266*** 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013) 
Belonging to a foreign group -0.887 -1.671 0.201** -1.126* 0.208** -1.088 
 (0.689) (1.088) (0.096) (0.663) (0.096) (0.664) 
Share of exports in total 
turnover (2008) 
0.105*** 0.098*** 0.004*** 0.360 0.004*** 0.102*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.571) (0.001) (0.007) 
IV: Family Managed   -0.284*    
   (0.158)    
IV: Derivative Usage   0.364***  0.362***  
   (0.127)  (0.127)  
Number of observations 12,671 12,671 12,652 12,652 
R-squared b 0.09  0.22 0.07 0.21 0.08 
First stage summary statistics  F(2,12641)  F(1,12624)  F(2,12623) 
  4.28549  104.998  48.9091 
P-value of the over-
identification test  
0.35 
  
 0.41 
Notes:   
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis; An intercept, ordinal size measures, ordinal age measures, sector-dummies and country-
dummies are included in the estimations above. 
a) The share of innovative product sales in the total turnover of a firm (IPS) is used as the dependent variable of the BLR and the 2SLS 
estimations above.  
b) The Pseudo R-squared is reported for the Pre-2SLS estimations.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: The effect of trade in innovative tasks on innovation measured by the extensive and the intensive margin of innovation, 
excluding the firms from the UK a 
 The extensive margin of innovation output The intensive margin of innovation output 
 Baseline Bivariate Probit 2SLS 
Control 
Function 
Baseline 
IV Estimation Using 
Heckman (1978) Method 
2SLS 
 Probit   LPM  OLS 
Pre-2SLS 
step 
2SLS step  
  LHS:DINN LHS:Ornd    LHS:Ornd LHS:IPS  
        IV:Ornd̂Fam,Dev  
 I II-1 II-2 III IV V VI-1 VI-2 VII 
Dummy for off-shoring 
innovative tasks (2008) 
0.428*** 1.920***  5.775** 3.570*** 5.658*  29.028* 42.751 
(0.148) (0.280)  (2.657) (0.831) (3.233)  (16.772) (46.795) 
Share of employees 
involved in R&D in 2008 
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.002** 0.010*** 0.244*** 0.009*** 0.254*** 0.251*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.013) (0.017) 
Belonging to a foreign 
group 
-0.229*** -0.238*** 0.215 -0.130*** -0.261*** -0.301 0.185 -0.125 -0.294 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.141) (0.049) (0.064) (0.785) (0.118) (0.709) (0.806) 
The share of exports in 
total turnover (2008) 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.102*** 0.005*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) 
Generalized Residuals     -1.339***     
     (0.342)     
IV: Family Managed   -0.429**    -0.344*   
   (0.172)    (0.187)   
IV: Derivative Usage   0.654***    0.526***   
   (0.155)    (0.142)   
Number of observations 10,793 10,793 10,793 10,780 10,793 10,780 10,793 
F-statistic F(27,10766) F(55, 10792)  F(27,10753)     
 36.99 53.77  37.02     
R-squared b          
First stage summary 
statistics    F(2,10764)  0.09 0.23 0.08 F(2,10764) 
    4.7946     8.6019 
P-value of the over-
identification test 
   0.87     0.06 
Estimated marginal effect 
of trade in innovative 
tasks on the probability of 
a firm being innovative as 
measured by DINN c 
0.1389 0.6603   0.8042     
(0.054) (0.063)   (0.010)     
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Notes:   
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis; An intercept, ordinal size measures, ordinal age measures, sector-dummies and country-dummies are 
included in the estimations above. 
a) The extensive margin of innovation is measured by disclosed innovation (DINN), and the intensive margin of innovation is measured by the average 
share of innovative product sales in turnover (IPS)  
b) The Pseudo R-squared is reported for the Pre-2SLS estimations. 
c)  Predicting Probability (DINNi=1) under Probit assumptions, the marginal effects of trade in innovative tasks are computed when all the control variables 
are kept at their means. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix  
Table A-1: Distribution of firms across countries and sectors 
Country Sector Total 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
AUT 100 46 22 64 13 8 8 54 0 67 61 443 
FRA 964 213 244 410 35 107 101 142 3 478 276 2,973 
GER 568 350 192 371 199 95 61 103 4 489 503 2,935 
HUN 108 63 40 68 22 20 14 17 0 68 68 488 
ITA 687 238 169 481 227 108 80 88 8 554 381 3,021 
SPA 648 463 148 223 280 121 106 212 0 326 305 2,832 
UK 355 147 122 349 262 104 54 89 6 371 208 2,067 
Total 3,430 1,520 937 1,966 1,038 563 424 705 21 2,353 1,802 14,759 
 
Table A-2: Distribution of firms across countries by economic activities 
Country 
Economies 
of 
Scale 
High-tech 
Specialized 
Industries 
Traditional 
Industries 
Not 
Classified 
Total 
AUT 105 23 66 140 109 443 
FRA 757 118 474 1,364 260 2,973 
GER 691 196 741 1,230 77 2,935 
HUN 133 15 106 226 8 488 
ITA 752 101 519 1,550 99 3,021 
SPA 578 96 436 1,636 86 2,832 
UK 709 99 323 891 45 2,067 
Total 3,725 648 2,665 7,037 684 14,759 
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Table A-3: A list of the sectors in the sample a 
 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 
 Manufacture of food product, beverage and tobacco 
 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
 Manufacture of textiles and textile products  
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  
Publishing and printing 
 Manufacture of leather and leather products  
Manufacture of other non metallic mineral product  
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 
 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers 
 Manufacture of transport equipment 
 Manufacture of wood and wood products 
 Manufacture of machine and equipment N.E.C 
 Manufacturing N.E.C. 
 Sector 9 
Notes:  
a) A randomized industry identifier is used in the EFIGE survey. 
 
 
 
Table A-4: The extensive margin of firm-level innovation measured by product/process innovation 
  
New-to-market 
product innovator 
   
Organizational 
Innovator b 
 
  No Yes Total   No Yes Total 
Product 
Innovator a 
No 7,514 0 7,514 Process 
Innovator a 
No 7,346 920 8,266 
Yes 2,596 4,649 7,245 Yes 2,722 3,771 6,493 
Total  10,110 4,649 14,759 Total  10,068 4,691 14,759 
Notes: 
a) The product/process innovation carried out in years 2007-2009  
b) Organizational innovation implied by product/process innovation. 
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Table A-5: Distribution of different types of firms across countries 
Country Full Sample Share a MNCs b Share a 
MNCs with off-
shore  innovative 
efforts c 
Share a 
AUT 443 3% 52 4% 6 3% 
FRA 2,973 20% 285 23% 39 23% 
GER 2,935 19% 307 25% 43 25% 
HUN 488 3% 21 1% 2 1% 
ITA 3,021 20% 221 18% 16 9% 
SPA 2,832 19% 116 9% 12 7% 
UK 2,067 14% 206 17% 48 28% 
Total 14,759  1,208  166  
Notes: 
a) Shares are computed for any given country relative to the total number of firms within sample and the sub-samples. 
b) Firms who have reported some FDI or foreign contracts and arms length agreements are identified as MNCs. 
c) Firms who have reported some FDI or foreign contracts and arms length agreements for R&D, engineering and design 
services are identified as those who have off-shored their innovative tasks. 
 
Table A-6: A correlation matrix between the key variables and the instruments 
 IPS  DINN  PrdINN  
R&D-
Emloyee 
Share 
Export 
Share 
Ornd  Fam  Dev  
IPS 1        
DINN 0.2398 1       
PrdINN  0.5403 0.355 1      
R&D-Emp. 
Share 
0.2188 0.1226 0.1845 1     
Export Share 0.198 0.2267 0.2271 0.0903 1    
Ornd 0.0554 0.096 0.0625 0.043 0.0766 1   
Fam -0.0067 -0.0892 -0.0499 0.0437 -0.1028 -0.048 1  
Dev 0.0352 0.1075 0.0766 0.0106 0.0912 0.047 -0.046 1 
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Survey questions 
In order to identify the MNCs in the sample, I make use of the following questions:1 
 Question D37: Does the firm currently run at least part of its production activity in 
another country? 
o Yes, through direct investment (i.e. foreign affiliates/controlled firms) 
o Yes, through contracts and arms length agreements with local firms 2 
o No 
 Question D38: Which percentage of 2008 turnover did the production activities through 
direct investment (foreign affiliates/controlled firms) represent? 
 Question D49: Which percentage of 2008 turnover did the production activities through 
contracts and agreements represent? 
I identify firm i as an MNC if it runs at least part of its production activity in another 
country via FDI (when firm i responds positively to the first choice in D37, and reports 
non-zero amount in D38) or contracts and arms length agreements (when firm i responds 
positively to the second choice in D37, and reports non-zero amount in D49). 
In order to identify the MNCs who partake in trade in innovative tasks, I make use of the 
following questions (D46 for FDI activities, and D55 for contracts and arms length 
agreements): 
 Question D46 and D55: Please indicate the main types of production activities carried out 
abroad amongst the following: 
o Finished products 
o Semi-finished products/components 
o R&D, engineering and design services  
o Other business services 
 
                                                          
1 The questionnaire can be downloaded from http://www.bruegel.org/datasets/efigedataset/ 
2 Contracts and agreements refer to technical/manufacturing partnership agreements, such as job 
processing contracts and other subcontracts, and the sale of manufacturing licenses to independent foreign 
firms. 
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Chapter 3
Productivity and Trade in Innovative Tasks
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between firms’ productivity and their international activities has
been widely studied in International Economics. Though it is unclear whether firms’
productivity improves as a result of their international activities (e.g. Keller 2010,
pp. 817-820), it is now well established that the most productive firms are more
likely to partake in international activities (e.g. Bernard et al. 2011, pp. 3-6).
Among other activities, this is evident in exporting (e.g. Melitz 2003) and foreign
direct investments (henceforth, FDI) (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004). This
selection may be of great importance for policy makers (e.g. when they face low
exchange rate pass-through). It also enables us to explain some interesting patterns
in the data. In particular, it helps us understand why only a small number of firms
partake in international activities such as exporting, importing, and trade in pro-
ductive and innovative tasks.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the superior productivity of the
firms that exploit the global task distribution in innovative activities. Multiple
empirical studies suggest that, among other types of task trades, firms gain from
trade in their innovative tasks (e.g. off-shoring R&D, design and engineering activ-
ities). This gain is evident when we examine firms’ performance. Ceci and Mas-
ciarelli (2010), for instance, suggest that trade in knowledge-intensive tasks has a
positive impact on the return on equity and also the return on sales. This gain
can also be measured in terms of innovation output. Kotabe et al. (2007) find
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that greater international knowledge content contributes to the innovation output
of American pharmaceutical firms. Nieto and Rodriguez (2011) examine a large
sample of Spanish firms, suggesting that trade in R&D tasks positively affects in-
novative performance of the firms, as measured by the propensity to innovate. In
particular, they find that trade in innovative tasks is more beneficial for product
innovation than process innovation. Along with the gains in terms of the extensive
margin of innovation (i.e. whether a firm innovates), Tabrizy (2015) suggests that
trade in innovative tasks may also contribute to the intensive margin of innovation
(i.e. how much a firm innovates). In a large sample of European firms, he finds
that those firms that off-shore their R&D, design and engineering activities are not
only more likely to innovate, but they also enjoy greater share of innovative product
sales in their total turnover. Since greater innovative product sales may contribute
to productivity (Cre`pon, Duguet, and Mairessec 1998) and profitability (Roberts
1999), it is important to examine whether trade in innovative tasks is beneficial on
the intensive margin of innovation output.
Given the gains from trade in innovative tasks, it is puzzling that only a small
number of Multinational Corporations (henceforth, MNCs) off-shore their innova-
tive activities. This could be caused by some intellectual property concerns. The
property right models of firm boundaries (e.g. Antra`s 2003) suggest that the trans-
action cost of performing innovative activities off-shore could be relatively high at
the equilibrium.1 This may suggest that those firms that off-shore their innovative
activities are more likely to do so via foreign integration (e.g. FDI in R&D, de-
sign and engineering activities) so they can manage the transaction cost, which is
typically caused by intellectual property risks. Given the predictions in Antra`s and
Helpman (2004), firms that are involved in foreign integration are expected to be
1This is not an explicit finding in Antra`s (2003) since he broadly examines the capital- vs.
labor-intensive tasks. Yet, it provides valuable insight into the possibility of relatively high cost
of off-shoring innovative activities. These tasks typically require a great amount of investment
in R&D equipment and highly skilled labor force, and they are expected to be performed at the
headquarters. Off-shoring those activities would, therefore, be very costly.
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very productive. These predictions imply that off-shoring R&D, design and engi-
neering activities are expected to be done via foreign integration and by the most
productive MNCs.
Focusing on the productivity premium, the working hypothesis of this paper is
as follows: Those MNCs that off-shore their innovative tasks are more productive
than MNCs that off-shore their non-innovative tasks. Compared to non-innovative
activities (e.g. production of (semi-)finished products(/components)), innovative
activities are more likely to be off-shored via foreign integration, which requires
greater productivity. Also, since MNCs are in general more productive, MNCs with
off-shore innovative activities are expected to be more productive than exporters as
well as firms that only serve the domestic markets. Thus, I examine the significance
of the productivity premium in the full sample of firms as well as the sub-sample of
MNCs.
A number of empirical studies examine the superior productivity of interna-
tional firms. This paper relates to three of them. The productivity of the firms
that integrate (domestically or abroad) and/or outsource (domestically or abroad)
are examined in these studies.2 In a sample of Italian manufacturing firms, Federico
(2010) finds that the most productive firms tend to integrate abroad, and that the
firms with medium-high productivity integrate domestically. He also finds that the
firms with medium-low productivity choose foreign outsourcing, and that the least
productive firms outsource domestically. Unlike the prediction in Antra`s and Help-
man (2004), therefore, his findings imply that firms that integrate (either abroad
or domestically) are more productive than firms that outsource (either abroad or
domestically). Kohler and Smolka (2012) examine a sample of Spanish firms. They
2To be perfectly clear, I explicitly define three terms that I use in this paper frequently: integra-
tion, outsourcing, and off-shoring. Firms integrate part of their productive/innovative activities
into another firm once they distribute those tasks across affiliated parties (e.g. foreign or do-
mestic M&A). They outsource those activities to another firm once they distribute them across
un-affiliated parties (e.g. arms length agreements with foreign or domestic firms). Given these two
definitions, off-shoring would generally refer to a case in which the second party is located in a
foreign country no matter if it is affiliated or not.
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verify that trade in tasks requires greater productivity. They also find that, in gen-
eral, integration requires greater productivity than outsourcing. Lastly, in a sample
of Japanese international firms, Tomiura (2007) finds that the most productive firms
tend to integrate off-shore, while the less productive ones tend to outsource abroad.
He also finds that the least productive firms remain at home. This pattern is well
in line with the sorting in Antra`s and Helpman (2004).
Employing a recent European firm-level survey, this paper contributes to this
literature by estimating the productivity premium of the firms that are actively
involved in trade in different types of tasks. These tasks include the production of
finished products, the production of semi-finished products/components, and R&D,
design and engineering services. I employ kernel density estimations, along with
linear and ordered Probit estimations to test whether those firms that off-shore
their R&D, design and engineering services are more productive than others. The
results suggest that compared to other firms in the full sample and the sub-sample
of MNCs, those MNCs that off-shore their innovative activities enjoy greater pro-
ductivity. This finding may provide an answer to the puzzle above: though MNCs
gain from trade in innovative tasks, they must be very productive in order to be
able to off-shore their innovative activities, which is why only a small number of
MNCs are able to successfully partake in trade in innovative tasks.
This empirical exercise does not address any causality questions. To examine
the causality relationship, one needs to design a randomized trial or to use some
exogenous variations that can predict whether a firm distributes it innovative tasks
across the globe.3 Unfortunately, I do not have access to any of the above. Nonethe-
less, in this paper, I am able to explore some interesting patterns that appear in the
data by estimating the productivity premium of those MNCs that distribute their
innovative tasks abroad.
3Tabrizy (2015) uses the variations in family management and the use of financial derivatives
to predict whether a firm partakes in trade in innovative tasks. Yet, those variations are not
necessarily exogenous to the variations in productivity.
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The data are discussed more fully in Section 2. The empirical analyses and
results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Data
Firm-level observations used in this study come from the European Firms in a
Global Economy (EFIGE) survey.4 For a sub-sample of firms (7,435 firms) this sur-
vey provides the estimated Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) total factor productivity
(henceforth, TFP). The TFP measure is estimated using firms’ value added, de-
flated by the industry-specific price indicies. This measure is part of the residual of
an estimated Cobb-Douglas production function in which the number of employees,
the value of tangible fixed assets, and the value of intermediate inputs are used to
predict any given firm’s value added.5
Also, this survey provides detailed information about the type of off-shore ac-
tivities in which firms are involved. In particular, one can observe whether any
given MNC off-shores the production of its finished products, the production of its
semi-finished products/components, and/or its R&D, design and engineering activ-
ities. These activities are performed off-shore either through FDI (integration) or
contracts and arms length agreements (outsourcing).
This survey provides an ideal dataset for this empirical exercise since one has
access to an unbiased estimation of firm-level TFP as well as detailed information
about the type of task trades in which MNCs are involved.
As illustrated in Figure 1, about 6.24% of the firms in the sample (464 firms) off-
shore the production of their finished products abroad (either via FDI or contracts
and arms length agreements); about 4.28% (318 firms) off-shore the production
4The EFIGE survey has been conducted by Bruegel, a European think tank, along with seven
other partners, and it is supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commis-
sion.
5Altomonte, Aquilante, and Ottaviano (2012) provide more information on the estimation pro-
cedure (pp. 59-60) and the validation of the measure (pp. 21-26).
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of their semi-finished products/components; and only about 1.28% (95 firms) off-
shore their R&D, design and engineering activities abroad. Interestingly enough,
the majority of MNCs that off-shore their innovative tasks are also involved in other
off-shore activities: 77 firms off-shore the production of their finished products and
61 firms off-shore the production of their semi-finished products/components. Fur-
ther, there are 50 firms that are involved in all three activities. On average, those 50
firms are much more productive than the other MNCs. The mean of the estimated
TFP measure for those firms is about 0.33 (with standard deviation of 0.52), while
the same mean for other MNCs is about 0.05 (with standard deviation of 0.66).
This survey also provides for a wide range of control covariates, which can be
incorporated in the empirical exercise. In what follows, I control for the variations
in the TFP across sectors and countries using a vector of indicator variables. As
indicated in Section 1, it is widely known that exporters are more productive than
non-exporters. Thus, I use an export status dummy to control for this. I also control
for an ordinal size measure, which is based on the firms’ annual turnover. The ordi-
nal size measures are useful to control for some unobservable size-specific variations
that cannot be controlled for in cross-section estimations.
The ordinal size measure is based on the annual turnover of the firms in 2008.
The turnover categories include: less than 1 million euros, between 1 and 2, 2 and
10, 10 and 15, 15 and 50, 50 and 250, or more than 250 million euros. The majority
of firms in the survey (43.47%) have reported an annual turnover between 2 and 10
million euros. Also, the annual turnover of about 20% of the firms is between 1 and
2 million euros. For about 12% of the firms this figure is between 15 and 50 million
euros. Less than 25% of the sample belong to the other four turnover categories
combined.
As summarized in Table 1, large firms (with annual turnover greater than 15
million euros in 2008) make up for a significant share of firms that are involved in
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task trade. In fact, about half of the firms that off-shore the production of their
finished products or semi-finished products/components are large. Also, when it
comes to trade in innovative tasks, 72% of the firms that off-shore their R&D, de-
sign and engineering activities are large, which may be an indicator of their superior
productivity.
3.3 Empirical analyses
In this section, I first employ a univariate kernel density estimation (KDE) for the
distribution of TFP among the MNCs that are involved in different types of off-
shore activities. Then, given the estimated kernel densities, I employ linear and
ordered Probit estimations to test the working hypothesis that MNCs with off-shore
innovative activities are more productive than other MNCs.
Figure 2 plots the KDE for the distribution of TFP among the firms that have
performed the following tasks off-shore: the production of finished products, the
production of semi-finished products/components, or R&D, design and engineering
activities. As illustrated in Figure 1, these activities are not mutually exclusive.
For instance, there are 50 firms in the sample that partake in all three task trades.
Figure 2 also plots the KDE for the distribution of TFP among the firms with no
FDI or contracts and arms length agreements. The KDE shows the probability of
picking a firm with a certain TFP when the firm is randomly drawn from each of
the above categories. 6 Among the MNCs, the estimated densities suggest that a
randomly drawn MNC with off-shore innovative activities is likely to be more pro-
ductive than a randomly drawn MNC with off-shore productive activities, including
the production of finished products or semi-finished products/components. It also
6Altomonte, Aquilante, and Ottaviano (2012) provide some illustrations of kernel densities for
different types of international activities such as exporting and importing. They also take into
account some of the activities that are related to task trade. By looking at different types of task
trades, this paper provides a detailed picture of the productivity differences across the firms that
are involved in different types of off-shore activities.
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appears that a randomly drawn MNC that off-shores the production of its finished
products is likely to be more productive than a randomly drawn MNC that off-
shores the production of its semi-finished products/components.7 Lastly, regardless
of the type of activity performed off-shore, a randomly drawn MNC is likely to be
more productive than a randomly drawn firm with no FDI or contracts and arms
length agreements.
The above KDE results form the working hypothesis of this paper: The MNCs
that off-shore their innovative tasks are more productive than the MNCs that off-
shore their non-innovative tasks. Those MNCs are also more productive than ex-
porters as well as firms that only serve the domestic markets. The following regres-
sion analyses provide two tests for this hypothesis.
For this purpose, I first employ the following regression function:
E[TFPi|Orndi, Xi] = α1Orndi +X ′iβ1 + E[i|Orndi, Xi] (3.1)
where TFPi is either the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm
i, estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach, or it is the TFP
decile to which TFPi belongs. I use linear techniques when I employ the TFP
measures directly, and I use ordered Probit techniques when I employ the deciles
on the left-hand side. Orndi is a dummy variable, which takes value one when firm
i performs its R&D, design and engineering activities off-shore, and zero otherwise.
Xi is a vector of control covariates, including an exporter status dummy, a set of
ordinal size dummies, a set of sector dummies, and a set of country dummies. This
regression function also includes a constant term. I estimate the parameters of the
above model in the full sample as well as the sub-sample of MNCs. The working
7Since the main focus of this paper is on trade in innovative tasks, I do not explore the difference
in productivity between the MNCs that off-shore the production of their finished products and
the MNCs that off-shore the production of their semi-finished products/components. Nonetheless,
the above KDE result may be taken as a preliminary evidence for the superior productivity of the
former group.
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hypothesis implies that α1 is positive and statistically significant.
The model given by Equation 3.1 can also be presented differently. For this
purpose, I define a dummy variable, Ofini, which takes value one when firm i does
not off-shore its innovative activities, yet it produces some finished products off-
shore. Ofini is zero otherwise. I define another dummy variable, Osemi, which takes
value one when firm i does not off-shore its innovative activities or the production
of its finished products, yet it produces some semi-finished products/components
off-shore. Osemi is zero otherwise. There are also 50 MNCs for which the type of
off-shore activities are unknown. I define a dummy variable, Otheri, for those firms.
8
Xi being the same as given in Equation 3.1, the alternative regression function is as
follows:
E[TFPi|Ofini, Osemi, Otheri, Xi] =
α21Ofini + α22Osemi + α23Otheri +X
′
iβ2 + E[i|Ofini, Osemi, Otheri, Xi]
(3.2)
I estimate the parameters of the above model only in the sub-sample of MNCs,
which enables me to compare the productivity of MNCs that perform (part of)
their innovative activities (and possibly other types of productive activities) off-
shore with those that produce (part of) their finished products (and possibly their
semi-finished products/components) off-shore and also with those that only pro-
duce (part of) their semi-finished products/components off-shore. Though this is a
slightly different regression function, the results are expected to be quite close to
the estimation results for Equation 3.1. The working hypothesis implies that α21
and α22 are negative and statistically significant.
9
The results confirm the pattern that emerges in the KDE plots: conditional upon
8Those 50 MNCs are not included in Figure 1.
9Since I do not know the type of off-shore activities in which the firms in Other category are
involved, I do not have any priors for the sign of α23.
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a wide range of covariates, those MNCs that off-shore their innovative activities are
more productive than other firms in the full sample and the sub-sample of MNCs.
Table 2 offers more details. The linear and the ordered Probit results in the full sam-
ple (columns I-1 and I-2 ) are quite predictable. Regardless of the types of activities
that are performed off-shore, MNCs are expected to be more productive than other
firms. In fact, the estimation results verify this: Compared to other firms, including
exporters and domestic firms, those MNCs that off-shore their innovative activities
are more productive.
The results for the sub-sample of MNCs are more interesting. Compared to
other MNCs who do not perform any innovative activities abroad, those MNCs that
off-shore their R&D, design and engineering activities are more productive. This is
reflected in the results reported in panels II and III in Table 2.
The linear and ordered Probit results, reported in columns II-1 and II-2, are
strong evidence of the superior productivity among the MNCs with off-shore inno-
vative efforts. In those estimations the control groups are the other MNCs in the
sample. Some of those MNCs in the control group off-shore the production of their
finished products or semi-finished products/components, and a minority of them
(50 firms) are involved in other types of off-shore activities that are unknown to me.
The estimation results suggest that there exists a positive and significant correlation
between the variable of interest and the TFP measures. Figure 3 plots the estimated
magnitude of the productivity premium of MNCs with off-shore innovative activities
over other MNCs. The estimated magnitudes are based on the marginal effect of the
ordered Probit estimation reported in column II-2. Those MNCs that off-shore their
innovative activities are about 8% more likely to belong to the 10th decile of the
TFP distribution. They are also about 5% more likely to belong to the 9th decile
of the TFP distribution. The estimated marginal effects for each decile, as given by
the solid line in Figure 3, add up to zero. Among them, only the results for the 8th
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and the 9th cut-off are statistically different from zero.10 Thus, compared to other
MNCs, those MNCs that off-shore their innovative activities are more productive.
The above results can also be presented in a slightly different way, as given by
Equation 3.2, in which the control group is made of the MNCs that off-shore their
innovative activities. The linear and ordered Probit results, reported in columns
II-1 and II-2, suggest that those MNCs that do not partake in trade in innovative
tasks, for which Ofin, Osem, or Other are equal to one, are less productive than
MNCs with off-shore innovative activities. The estimated marginal effects based on
the ordered Probit estimation reported in column III-2 also confirm this.
3.4 Conclusion
Despite the estimated gains from trade in innovative tasks, only a small number
of MNCs off-shore their innovative activities. This is puzzling. In an attempt to
provide an answer to this puzzle, I explore the superior productivity of the MNCs
with off-shore innovative activities compared to the other firms in the full sample
and the sub-sample of MNCs. The results suggest that not only are those MNCs
more productive than other firms in the full sample, but they are also significantly
more productive than other MNCs. This superior productivity may explain why
only a small number of MNCs partake in trade in innovative tasks.
Two caveats should be noted. First, the TFP measure in use is based on the
residuals of a firm-specific Cobb-Douglas production function, which is estimated
using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach. Thus, the dependent variable may
suffer from measurement error. Unless the measurement error is well-behaved, the
precision of the estimated parameter of interest can be a bit weak (Green 2012,
pp. 97-99). That said, the estimated Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) productivity is
among the most reliable TFP measures, which is widely used in empirical studies.
10Detailed estimations of the cut-off coeficients available upon request.
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Second, a shock to the error term in the regression function, as given by Equa-
tion 3.1, not only affects the TFP measure, but it may also affect the likelihood
that a firm partakes in trade in innovative tasks. This endogeneity may also cause
biased estimations. To address this endogeneity, however, one should either have
access to a randomized trial or employ an exogenous variations to predict whether
a firm off-shores its innovative activities. That way, one can precisely estimate how
trade in innovative tasks may affect firms’ productivity. In the absence of such trials
and exogenous variations, this paper is among the first studies that look into the
productivity requirements for off-shoring different types of tasks. The results imply
that only those MNCs that belong to the highest two deciles of productivity are
able to partake in trade in innovative tasks. This productivity requirement may
explain why only a small number of firms gain from the global task distribution in
innovative activities.
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3.5     Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Number of firms involved in different types of off-shore activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Number of firms involved in different types of off-shore activities, 
categorized based on their annual turnover in 2008. 
 Number of firms who off-shore: 
Annual turnover 
in 2008 
(in million euros) 
the production of 
their finished 
products 
the production of 
their semi-finished 
products/components 
their R&D, design 
and engineering 
activities 
< 1 3 4 1 
1-2 18 10 1 
2-10 145 115 21 
10-15 48 39 3 
15-50 115 76 26 
50-250 86 49 24 
> 250 46 25 18 
Total 461 a 318 94 b 
Share of Large 
Firms c 
53% 47% 72% 
Note: 
a) The turnover information is not available for 3 firms in this category. 
b) The turnover information is not available for 1 firm in this category. 
c) Firms with annual turnover greater than 15 million euros (2008) are identified as 
Large. 
The production of finished 
products 
(464 firms) 
The production of semi-finished 
products/components 
(318 firms) 
Innovative activities; i.e. R&D, 
design and engineering 
(95 firms) 
50 firms 
159 firms 
27 firms 11 firms 
7 firms 
228 firms 98 firms 
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimation for the distribution of TFP among MNCs 
 
 
Table 2: The regression results   
 Full Sample Sub-sample of MNCs 
 OLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
LHS: TFP 
TFP 
Deciles 
TFP 
TFP 
Deciles 
TFP 
TFP 
Deciles 
 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 III-1 III-2 
Ornd 0.133** 0.218* 0.205*** 0.340**   
 (0.056) (0.118) (0.064) (0.134)   
Ofin     -0.198*** -0.329** 
     (0.064) (0.135) 
Osem     -0.242** -0.384** 
     (0.101) (0.174) 
Other     -0.196** -0.350* 
     (0.090) (0.201) 
Export a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sizes a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 7,426 7,426 630 630 630 630 
Adj. R2 0.286 0.087 0.251 0.110 0.250 0.110 
Note: 
a) The control covariates include an export status dummy, a set of ordinal size dummies, a set 
of sector dummies, and a set of country dummies. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
120 
 
Figure 3: The estimated marginal effects for different productivity deciles based 
on the estimation results reported in Table 2, column II-2  
 
 
Figure 4: The estimated marginal effects for different productivity deciles based 
on the estimation results reported in Table 2, column III-2 
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Research Presentation
2014: Southern Economic Association Conference (Atlanta, GA); Midwest Economics
Association Conference (Evanston, IL); UWM Weekly Economics Seminar Series
(Milwaukee, WI)
2013: Southern Economic Association Conference (Tampa, FL); Midwest Interna-
tional Trade Conference, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI); Wisconsin Eco-
nomics Association Conference (Stevens Point, WI); UWM International Economics
Lunch (Milwaukee, WI)
2010: IfW ASP Research Seminar (Kiel, SH)
2009: OVGU International Economics Seminar (Magdeburg, SA)
2005: ATU Students Conference on Iran’s Economy (Tehran)
Teaching Experience
Fall 2013: Introduction to International Economic Relations (Econ 351)
Spring 2013: Environmental Economics (Econ 328)
Fall 2013 - Spring 2015: Economics of Personal Finance (Econ 110)
Fall 2010 - Spring 2015: Principle of Microeconomics (Econ 103)
Academic Services
Refereeing: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
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Discussant: Southern Economic Association Conference (Atlanta, GA, 2014); Midwest
Economics Association Conference (Evanston, IL, 2014); Southern Economic Associ-
ation Conference (Tampa, FL, 2013)
Teaching: Financial Literacy, UWM Student Support Services (Milwaukee, WI, 2013)
Awards and Scholarships
Chancellor’s Graduate Student Award, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee (2010
- 2012)
IfW ASP Scholarship, ASP Alumni Association (2009 - 2010)
Language and Computer Skills
Language: Persian (native), English (fluent), and German (functional)
Computer: STATA, EViews, GUASS, Maple, LaTex, and MS-Office
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